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China1. Introduction
China's Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) transactions, including domestic consolidation, as well as outward and inward takeovers,
have significantly increased in recent years (see Table 1). According to Bloomberg's 2012M&A outlook, China engaged in 158 billion
US dollars' worth of takeover deals in 2011. This represents a 9% increase from the 145 billion US dollars announced in 2010.
Several explanations have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. First, the gradual establishment and development of China's
capital markets and the impact of globalization have played a significant role. Specifically, China's accession to theWorld Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) in 2001 encouraged Chinese enterprises to restructure and consolidate throughM&As, in order to defend themselves from
the influxof strong foreign competitors and/or to expand their business territories overseas. Second, given the high growth rates and large
amounts of profits generated by Chinese firms, strategicmergers, including inward and outwardM&A investments, have offered Chinese
firms opportunities to seek further economies of scale or other synergies, enhancing their competitive advantage. Third, M&As have be-
come easier in the light of the relaxation of obstacles to their approval process, and of the constantly evolving regulatory and taxation
framework surrounding them. Fourth, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been restructuring their assets through M&As. In
particular, SOEs operating in strategically relevant sectors such as basic materials, energy, utilities, telecommunications, aerospace, and
defense have been encouraged to form global conglomerates. At the same time, other SOEs have been required to reduce their equity
to generate efficiency improvements and increase competitiveness. This has offered opportunities of market entry for other potential in-
vestors (Devonshire-Ellis et al., 2011). However, could other factors also contribute to explaining the surge in Chinese M&As?g).
r B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Table 1
Distribution of the number of M&A deals in China by year.
Year Non-Bidders Bidders Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only Completed Total No. Bidder Perc.
1998 709 15 0 1 14 9 724 2.07%
1999 789 21 0 0 21 8 810 2.59%
2000 913 20 0 0 20 7 933 2.14%
2001 984 21 0 1 20 8 1005 2.09%
2002 979 88 2 6 80 40 1067 8.25%
2003 939 184 1 17 166 75 1123 16.38%
2004 948 265 2 24 239 79 1213 21.85%
2005 1045 172 0 9 163 51 1217 14.13%
2006 1083 182 11 17 154 57 1265 14.39%
2007 1094 266 31 14 221 83 1360 19.56%
2008 1072 349 63 9 277 124 1421 24.56%
2009 1180 298 48 17 233 97 1478 20.16%
2010 1374 325 39 23 263 109 1699 19.13%
2011 1505 341 28 14 299 117 1846 18.47%
2012 1606 318 30 14 274 115 1924 16.53%
2013 1611 327 56 11 260 148 1938 16.87%
2014 1567 368 82 11 275 162 1935 19.02%
2015 1494 436 115 15 306 190 1930 22.59%
Total 20,892 3996 508 203 3285 1479 24,888 16.06%
Notes: this table reports the time-series distribution of the number of observations. Bidders represent the firms who announced a bid in a given year. Non-Bidders rep-
resent thefirmswhodid not announce a bid in a given year. Stock Only includes deals thatwerefinanced only by stock. Cash Only includes deals that were financed only
by cash.Mixed PYMT consists of those deals whose paymentswere not solely completed through stock or cash. Completed represents the deals whose transactionswere
completed. Total No. represents the total number of observations in a given year.
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highlight the relatively highfinancial capacitywhich characterizes Chinese firms due to their high growth rates and ability to generate
large amounts of internal funds. Along similar lines, Guariglia and Yang (2016a) document that, in their sample of Chinese listedfirms
covering the period 1998–2010, themedian level of cash holdings to total assets is 12.1%, much higher than the overall median (6.2%)
of the 45 countries analyzed by Dittmar et al. (2003). In addition, the average level of cash holdings in China almost doubled over their
sample period. An interesting question is therefore whether these high and growing levels of corporate liquidity are linked to the
surge in Chinese M&As. This paper seeks to investigate this issue.
Theories that focus on corporate liquidity and the costs of cash holdings can help to understand what drives acquisitions. From a
micro perspective, the existence of capital market imperfections (CMI) contributes to financial frictions, as a consequence of which
firms face a cost premium on external finance. Under these circumstances, it is suggested that firms prefer to use internal finance
like cash or retained earnings rather than external finance such as bank loans, debt, and equity (Myers, 1984). In particular, compared
to their financially healthy counterparts, financially constrained firms value their cash holdings more since liquidity allows them to
investwithout having to access new costly debt or equity (Faulkender andWang, 2006). Thus, corporate liquidity should play a crucial
role in investment decisions, including acquisitions. In particular, liquidity may enable firms to undertake acquisitions, as it can be
used directly as a measure of payment or can be used tomeet interest payments on debt finance. It follows that an increase in corpo-
rate liquidity should enhance firms' acquisition activities. In line with this argument, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) note that high cor-
porate liquidity has driven world merger waves in the last century.1 More recently, focusing on data from 36 countries, Erel et al.
(2017) find that higher cash holdings increase the probability a firm will undertake an acquisition.
Furthermore, consistent with the agency costs theory, the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) may also explain why firms
with high liquidity aremore likely to engage in takeovers: A high liquidity offers in factmanagers the incentive tomake self-interested
and entrenched decisions on low-benefit projects or acquisitions. Hanson (1992) finds evidence that acquiring firms with large free
cash flow tend to undertake low-benefit acquisitions. Harford (1999) alsofinds a positive relation between cash-richness and the like-
lihood of a bid, whichhe attributes to the presence of agency conflicts betweenmanagement and shareholders. In linewith the agency
costs of free cashflow explanation for acquisitions, a negativemarket reaction for acquiringfirmswith excess cash has been observed,
due to the expectation of poor future performance. For instance, Oler (2008) finds that the level of cash flow of acquirer firms is sig-
nificantly negatively related to their performance in terms of post-acquisition returns on net operating assets.2
Despite the numerous studies that rationalize the liquidity reason of the occurrence ofmergers and acquisitions, only a few papers
have paid attention to the motives behind China's takeovers (Chi et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2015; Black et al., 2015). To the best of our1 Along similar lines, according to the neoclassical hypothesis, industry assets can be restructured via mergers, in response to technological, regulatory, or supply
shocks, provided that sufficient capital liquidity is available. Harford (2005) argues that economic motivation and high macro-level capital liquidity have generated a
large number of merger deals over time. Similarly, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) observe that procyclical capital liquidity goes hand in hand with capital reallocation
among firms, suggesting that liquidity is a critical factor for industry shocks to generate merger waves.
2 Similarly, using a sample of pure stock acquisitions, Gao (2011) observes lower announcement returns for acquiring firms with excess cash, and explains this find-
ing not in the light of agency costs, but of adverse selection costs associatedwith corporate cash holdings in the presence of asymmetric information. Yet, it should also
be noted thatM&As represent a quick way to spend excess cash, which may limit the discretion of management and relieve the agency problems of free cash flow. Ac-
cording to Myers and Majluf (1984) and Smith and Kim (1994), mergers can in fact create value by reducing resource misallocations (e.g. combining the resources of
cash-surplus firms with firms without sufficient financial slack).
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the country, the Chinese case represents an ideal laboratory to further our understanding of themotives behind acquisitions and other
aspects of merger policies.
Our work contributes to existing literature in the following two ways. First, it analyzes for the first time, the interactions between
corporate liquidity and M&As in the Chinese context. Considering the very high levels of cash holdings characterizing Chinese firms,
this represents an interesting research question. In particular, we investigate the extent towhich takeovers in China are driven by free
cash flow and/or expropriation motives. This will enable us to assess whether it is agency costs between managers and owners that
can explain mergers, as proposed in Western countries (Jensen, 1986; Hanson, 1992; Smith and Kim, 1994; Harford, 1999; Oler,
2008); or if, instead, in emerging economies such as China, where weak corporate governance coexists with high ownership concen-
tration, it is the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders, which is responsible for M&As. Second, we investigate
the extent to which opportunity costs of holding cash and financing constraints can explain the novel finding that cash bidders in the
Chinese context perform worse than stock bidders, which goes in sharp contrast to the existing evidence from Western countries.
Third, our paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of acquiring firms' short- and long-term performance in relation to different
methods of payment.
Overall, our study, which is based on a panel of 2013 listed firms over the period 1998–2015, provides a portrait of the nature and
implications of M&As in China, and sheds light on how liquidity affects firms' acquisition decisions, method of payment choices, and
post-merger performance.We provide support for the agency costs of free cash flowhypothesis, according towhich cash-rich Chinese
firms tend to make use of their excess cash to take over other firms. We also find that the role of cash manifests itself more for firms
with a greater likelihood of tunneling, which provides further support to the agency costs of free cash flowhypothesis. Next, given the
impact of the opportunity cost of holding cash, we find that, especially for financially constrained firms, greater growth prospects,
reflected by a higher Tobin's Q, reduce bidders' willingness to use cash payments in acquisitions. Our results also indicate that cash
acquisitions underperform stock ones: Abnormal announcement returns are found to be worse for cash bidders. This is consistent
with the explanation that given their lower opportunity cost of holding cash, financially rich firms with few growth prospects are
more likely to use excess cash as payment to undertake value-destroying M&A deals. Taking a longer-term perspective, we also ob-
serve a decrease in average bidders' performance one to two years after acquisitions financed in cash, which once again supports
the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis as an explanation for acquisitions by firms with excess cash.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a reviewof related research anddevelops our hypotheses. In
Section 3, we describe themain features of our data and present summary statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. Section
5 concludes.2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development
2.1. Tunneling motive of acquisitions in China
In the presence of information asymmetries, liquid assets can protect firms from the costs associated with capital market imper-
fections. According to Keynes (1936), holding a sufficient amount of liquid assets enables firms to undertake valuable projects once
the opportunity arises. However, liquiditymay also givemanagementflexibility to pursue its ownobjectives, whichmay be detrimen-
tal to thefirm. The free cash flowhypothesis advanced by Jensen (1986) suggests thatmanagers endowedwith free cashfloware like-
ly to expand their firms beyond the optimal size or undertake unprofitable projects. Given the fact that excess cash can be seen as
hoarded free cash flow, excess cash reserves can lead to agency conflicts over the disposal of cash. In the light of these considerations,
it should be noted that M&As represent a quick way to spend cash instead of paying it out to shareholders. Thus, when a firm accu-
mulates more than its normal level of cash, it is more likely to engage in takeovers (Harford, 1999).
Yet, the divergence of interests betweenmajority shareholders andminority shareholdersmight play an evenmore important role
in explaining mergers and acquisitions, especially in an emergingmarket economy such as China. This is because, in China, tunneling
(which refers to the appropriation of a firm's assets and the expropriation of minority investors by controlling shareholders or man-
agers for personal gain) is widespread among listed firms. This is due to their unique concentrated ownership structure and the share
segmentation system,3 as well as to the weak corporate governance mechanisms and public enforcement (Liu and Lu, 2007; Jiang et
al., 2010; Peng et al., 2011; Bhaumik and Selarka, 2012). Firms subject to tunneling might make strategically self-interested and
entrenched decisions such as M&As to divert resources away from disbursal among shareholders (Bhaumik and Selarka, 2012). In
other words, M&As or other related party transactions between Chinese listed firmsmay provide direct opportunities for controlling
shareholders, management and/or local governments to direct assets or profits out of firms, helping them in this way achieve their
personal or political benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.4
We suggest that an acquisition decision in China is unlikely to be motivated by purely economic considerations for the following
reasons. First, in China,most publicly listed companies are carve-outs or spin-offs from large state-owned enterprises, formed through
the divestment of less profitable or unrelated subsidiary businesses. These listed firms are strongly dependent on their parent firms, as3 Before the 2005 split share structure reform, which was gradually implemented by Chinese firms over the period 2005–2010, the shares of listed firms in China
could be either tradable or non-tradable (J. Chen et al., 2016; Cumming and Hou, 2014). After the implementation of the reform, all shares became tradable.
4 A related party transaction is defined as any transaction such as asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity transfers, loan guarantees, accounts receivable, and so on, be-
tween listed subsidiaries and their affiliated parent companies (controlling shareholders). Related party transactions in the form of M&As are common in China (Chi et
al., 2011). These transactions give direct opportunities to controlling shareholders to extract cash from their related listedfirms through tunneling (Djankov et al., 2008).
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inefficient parents. In some cases, the listed firmsmay be asked to take over the poor-performing assets or shares of their parent firms
or controlling shareholders, or to purchase the assets or shares at a higher price (than the real value), particularly when these listed
firms experience high profitability or hold excess cash in hand. A case study that illustrates this issue is presented in Appendix 1.
Second, in China, it is very common for acquirers and targets to have strong connections with or belong to the same local govern-
ment supervision. Local government-controlled shareholders have a strong incentive to intervene in corporate business activities, as
listed firms play a significant role in the regional economic development and socialwelfare. Moreover, themanagement of listed SOEs
is often appointed by the government (their controlling shareholders). In order to support loss-making small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) achieve political objectives, avoid unemployment, andmaintain social stability, themanagement of these listedfirms
with high profitability or excess liquidity may be required by the government to absorb the SMEs, and engage in administrative
restructuring plans to turn around their performance (Chi et al., 2011). Especially, when local governments face large fiscal deficits,
or when unemployment is high, they may have higher incentives to interfere in the M&A deals of firms affiliated with them.
Third, controlling shareholders or local governors have a strongmotivation to build empires and/or to stimulate regional economic
growth through M&As, which may not maximize shareholders' wealth, but increase instead the resources and power in their hands
and give them the chance to stand out in the political competition for promotion (Liu and Lu, 2007; Guariglia and Yang, 2016b).
In summary, tunneling may be a strong motivation behind acquisition activities in China, as controlling shareholders (local gov-
ernments) and management may use M&As as opportunities to spend excess cash for their private benefit instead of paying it out
to their shareholders. We, therefore, propose our first hypothesis:
HΙ: In the Chinese context, cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions, especially if they are subject to tunneling.
2.2. Opportunity cost of holding cash
Substantial empirical evidence has documented a precautionary motive for cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007;
Bates et al., 2009). In the event of unexpected earnings shortfalls or costly external finance, ex-ante cash reserves prevent firms from
underinvesting ex-post. Especiallywhen high-Q “glamor” firms have difficulties in accessing external capital due to asymmetric infor-
mation problems, liquidity management can play an important role. In line with these arguments, Almeida et al. (2004) argue that
financially constrained firms have a greater propensity to save cash out of cash flow. Furthermore, Faulkender and Wang (2006)
find that firms with higher financial constraints benefit more from holding cash than their financially healthier counterparts.
The level of financial frictions has been found to have a large bearing on firms' investment decisions (Fazzari et al., 1988; Harford,
1999). As a particular type of investment, M&A activities should also be strongly influenced by these frictions. Acquiring firms face a
choice of payment between cash and stock. In line with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, Alshwer et al. (2011) show
thatfinancially constrainedUSbidderswithhigh growth opportunities (reflected by a highTobin'sQ) face a higher opportunity cost of
holding cash, and prefer therefore to save more cash to avoid the costs of forgoing positive net present value (NPV) projects in the
future. This suggests that opportunity costs of holding cash and financing constraints can both explain the method of payment. Ex-
tending Alshwer et al.'s (2011) arguments to the Chinese case, we argue that in the presence of a higher Tobin's Q, financially
constrained bidders would rather not spend cash on acquisitions since they face higher opportunity costs of holding cash. By contrast,
firms with easier access to financial markets may not have such a strong preference for paymentmethods, since theymay easily fund
their current or future investments using debt or equity. In the light of these considerations, our secondhypothesis takes the following
form:
HΙΙ: In the Chinese context, acquirers' cash payment decisions are negatively related to growth opportunities (Tobin's Q). This association
is stronger for financially constrained bidders compared to their financially healthier counterparts.
Based on the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, we argue that, in the Chinese context, acquiring firms prefer to use cash
in acquisitionswhen they face a lower opportunity cost of holding cash, i.e. when investment opportunities are low. Thismay result in
cash being wasted on acquisitions, which may, in turn, result in underperformance of acquiring firms. This is in contrast to evidence
fromWestern countries, where cash acquisitions outperform stock acquisitions as the former signal positive information, while the
latter signal asymmetric information (Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Loughran and Anand, 1997; Andrade et al., 2001; Linn and
Switzer, 2001; Abhyankar et al., 2005). Our third hypothesis posits therefore that, in the Chinese context, contrary towhat is observed
in Western countries, cash payments have a negative effect on market reaction and post-merger operating performance. In other
words:
HΙII: In the Chinese context, acquirers who use cash to finance their acquisitions perform significantly worse than acquirers who use
stock. Specifically, compared to stock bidders, cash bidders exhibit lower short-run abnormal returns. Additionally, cash bidders show de-
creasing operating performance from the pre- to the post-merger period.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. The dataset
To test our hypotheses, we construct a sample of firms that issued A-shares on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during the period 1998–2015. The data is based on annual observations and taken from the China
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and China Center for Economics Research (CCER) database. Following
the literature, we exclude firms in the financial sector, due to their different measurement of liquidity, and their dissimilar
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the potential influence of outliers. Finally, we drop all firmswith less than three years of consecutive observations, as ourmodels con-
tain leads and lags of relevant variables. All variables are deflated using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (National Bureau of
Statistics of China).
In addition, our sample includes all Chinese acquisitions announced between January 1st 1998 and December 31st 2015, taken
from the Thomson Financial SDC (Securities Data Corporation)Mergers and Acquisitions database. Acquiring firms are Chinese public
firms listed on either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Target firms are both publicly and privately held corporations,
located in China. Both successful and unsuccessful deals are taken into consideration.When the biddermakesmultiple acquisition at-
tempts during a year, we only consider the first attempt during that year as we are unable to identify the others. The M&A sample is
matched with the accounting information from our main dataset.
Ourfinal unbalanced panel consists of 24,888firm-year observations representing 2013 listed firms. The number of years available
for each firmvaries between three and eighteen,while the number of firm-year observations varies fromaminimumof 724 in 1998 to
a maximum of 1938 in 2013. The sample includes 1152 unique acquirers making 3966 deals.5 Table 1 provides a breakdown of non-
bidders and bidders by year, differentiated bymethod of payment. We observe a clear increasing trend of the number of M&As in our
sample period. This could be explained by the significant increase in the level of cash held by Chinese companies over the same period
(Guariglia andYang, 2016a). In addition, themajority of our acquiringfirms (82.2%) use cash as payment in acquisitions, whereas only
12.7% of bidders use pure stock.63.2. Summary statistics
Table 2 presents means and medians of key variables for the full sample, and provides a comparison of these same statistics for
bidders and non-bidders. We also conduct statistical tests for equality of the means (t-test) and sample medians (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test) of each variable across the two groups. All variables are defined in Appendix 2. With regard to liquidity variables [Cash,
net working capital (NWC)], bidders show lower mean and median liquidity ratios (e.g. 0.154 and 0.128 for Cash) compared to
non-bidders (e.g. 0.175 and 0.137 for Cash). Moreover, bidders exhibit, on average, a slightly higher leverage (mean: 0.219; median:
0.21) than non-bidders (mean: 0.192; median: 0.173). P-values associated with tests for equality of both sample means (t-test) and
samplemedians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) show that, in both cases, the differences are significant at the 1% level. The higher leverage
and lower liquidity shown by bidders might be due to the fact that they need to increase leverage and spend liquidity to engage in
acquisitions. In unreported results, we also find that the liquidity of bidding firms is significantly higher than that of non-bidders in
the year prior to acquisitions. This confirms that bidders spend a large amount of cash in acquisitions.
We also observe that acquiring firms are larger than their non-acquiring counterparts, regardless of whether size is measured in
terms of assets or number of employees, and show better performance than non-bidders in terms of sales growth and stock returns
(Return). Once again, p-values associated with tests for equality of both sample means (t-test), and sample medians (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test) show that the differences are significant at the 1% level.
In order to measure incentives for tunneling, following Jiang et al. (2010), we use the ratio of other receivables to total assets
(OREC),7 and the separation of the blockholder's controlling right and her/his ownership right (DIF_Blockholders).8 We observe that
42.3% of the bidders in our sample exhibit a divergence between the blockholder's controlling ownership and cash flow ownership
(DIF_Blockhoders), which is significantly larger than the corresponding value observed for non-bidders (31.8%). However, bidders
do not display a higher ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) compared to non-bidders (the corresponding ratios for the
two groups of firms are 0.032 and 0.041, respectively). This suggests that acquisitions are not solely fueled by tunneling.
Table 2 also shows that bidders are more likely to pay dividends (Payout). This suggests that they might distribute cash via divi-
dends to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. Finally, CEOs in bidder companies are less likely to hold shares in their own com-
pany compared to non-bidders. Given thatmanagerial ownership (Shareholding_CEO) aligns themanagers' interests with those of the
firm's shareholders, firmswith higher managerial ownership are in fact less likely to make entrenched decisions on value-decreasing
acquisitions.5 See Table 1 for more details about the structure of our sample. Given the unbalanced nature of our panel, which allows for both entry and exit, potential selection
and survivor bias are eased.
6 The split share structure of China's stockmarkets led to difficulties in valuing firms' stocks, particularly for non-tradable shares. For this reason, pure stock-for-stock
was not a popular payment method before the mid-2000s. As seen from Table 1, over 99% of stock acquisitions took place after the 2005 split share structure reform.
Moreover, the category ofMixed PYMT in our study refers to all methods of payment different from all-cash or all-stock. They include acquisitions made with mixed
payments (e.g. cash and stock), debt-arrangements, and asset swaps.
7 As evidence, a survey of 130 listed Chinese firms undertaken by the Shenying andWanguo Securities Co., Ltd. documents that, on average, 40million US dollars are
owed by the controlling shareholders to their listed companies in the form of accounts receivable or lending to the parent firms (Liu and Lu, 2007). In addition, Jiang et
al. (2010) claim that “during 1996–2006, tens of billions in RMB were siphoned [through inter-corporate loans] from hundreds of Chinese listed firms by controlling
shareholders” (p.2). The authors explain that these inter-corporate loans can be found in the balance sheets of the majority of listed firms in China and are typically
reported as “Other Receivables”. A more in-depth discussion of the OREC variable can be found in Section 4.2.
8 According to Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), the separation of cash flow and control rights tends to give blockholders ef-
fective control on the firms by only holding a relatively low proportion of shares, via pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. The probability and danger of
the exploitation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder (i.e. “tunneling”) is high if these two agents do not have the same interests. A more in-depth
discussion of the DIF_Blockholders variable can be found in Section 4.2.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Non-Bidders Bidders All Diff.Mean Diff.Median
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Cash 0.175 0.137 0.154 0.128 0.171 0.135 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Xcash 0 −0.009 0 −0.006 0 −0.008 0.61 0.08⁎
Size 20.58 20.4 21.06 20.91 20.65 20.48 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Employees 4361 1934 5867 2552 4610 2019 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
ROA 0.03 0.035 0.03 0.029 0.03 0.034 0.87 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Sales growth 0.141 0.071 0.176 0.085 0.147 0.073 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Return 0.295 0.07 0.394 0.117 0.311 0.077 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
CAPEX 0.056 0.04 0.054 0.04 0.056 0.04 0.12 0.83
PE 108.9 35.92 85.73 31.7 105.2 35.33 0.66 0.00⁎⁎⁎
CF 0.054 0.058 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.47 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Var_CF 0.111 0.088 0.11 0.088 0.111 0.088 0.60 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Tobin 2.039 1.57 2.095 1.513 2.048 1.562 0.03 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Leverage 0.192 0.173 0.219 0.21 0.196 0.179 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
NWC −0.036 −0.016 −0.089 −0.086 −0.044 −0.027 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
OREC 0.041 0.013 0.032 0.013 0.04 0.013 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.25
Blockholders 0.385 0.364 0.37 0.355 0.383 0.363 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Payout 55.3% 57.9% 55.7% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Shareholding_CEO 34.5% 24.6% 32.9% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
DIF_Blockholders 31.8% 42.3% 33.5% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
SOEs 60.1% 65.2% 60.9% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Notes: firms that are flagged as bidders (non-bidders) are those who did (did not) announce a bid in a given year. Cash (Cash-to-assets ratios) is the ratio of the sum of
cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Xcash is the unexpected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW (1999)model estimatedwith the fixed-effects estima-
tor. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Employees is the number of employees. ROA is return on assets. Sales growth is the annual rate of growth of real sales.
Return is the annual stock returns. CAPEX is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio. CF is the ratio of the sum of
net profits and depreciation to total assets. Var_CF is the mean of the standard deviations of the cash flow over total assets for all firms in a given industry in a given
year. Tobin (Q) is themarket-to-book ratio. Leverage is the ratio of the sumof short- and long-term debt to total assets.NWC is the ratio of net working capital (working
capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. OREC is the ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets. Blockholders is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest
shareholder. Payout is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is paying dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy var-
iable that takes the value of one if thefirm's CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise.DIF_Blockholders is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the firm's blockholder's cash flow ownership is lower than the controlling ownership in a given year, and 0 otherwise. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the
value of 1 if the firm is state owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise. For the last four dummy variables (Payout, Shareholding_CEO, DIF_Blockholders, SOEs), we present
the percentage of firms for which each dummy variable takes value of one in the sample. All variables (with the exception of the dummies) are deflated using the GDP
deflator. Diff.Mean and Diff.Median are the p-values associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of medians of corre-
sponding variables between bidders and non-bidders. *, *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
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4.1. Do cash holdings help predict the probability of being a bidder?
Following Harford (1999), we first study the link between firms' characteristics and acquisition decisions. In particular, by inves-
tigatingwhether high cash reserves are associatedwith a higher chance of attempting acquisitions, we examinewhether the behavior
of cash-rich firms is consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow explanation. To this end, we estimate the following model
whereby the dependent variable is coded as one if the firm announces a bid in year t+ 1, and zero otherwise:9 DefiPr Bidder ¼ 1ð Þi;tþ1 ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Xcashi;t þ b2 Returni;t þ b3Qi;t þ b4ROAi;t þ b5Salesgrowthi;t þ b6NWCi;t
þ b7Leveragei;t þ b8PEi;t þ b9Sizei;t þ b10Shareholding CEOi;t þ b11Blockholdersi;t þ b12SOEsi;t
þ b13ROAi;t  Qi;t þ vi þ vt þ vj þ vp þ εi;t
ð1ÞThe subscript i indexes firms; t, years (t= 1998–2015); j, industries; and p, provinces. Xk,i,t is a vector of explanatory variables, in-
cluding firms' financial characteristics and ownership structure variables, which might affect firms' acquisition decisions (Harford,
1999). Our primary variable of interest is unexpected (excess) cash (Xcash), defined as the difference between real cash holdings
and the optimal cash level predicted by the Opler et al. (1999, hereafter OPSW) model.9 Return represents annual stock returns;
Tobin (Q), the market-to-book ratio; ROA, the return on assets; Sales growth, the annual rate of growth of real sales; NWC, the ratio
of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets; Leverage, the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term
debt to total assets; PE, the price-to-earnings ratio; Size, the natural logarithm of total assets. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the firm's CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Blockholders is the percentagenitions of all variables used in this paper can be found in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 describes in detail how Xcash is calculated.
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year, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we include ROA ∗ Tobin to estimate the interaction effect between the two variables.
The error term in Eq. (1) consists of five components. vi is a firm-specific effect, embracing any time-invariant firm characteristics
whichmight influence firms' acquisitions strategies, as well as the time-invariant component of themeasurement error affecting any
variable in our regression. vt is a time-specific effect, which we control for by including time dummies capturing possible business
cycle effects, as well as the impact of changes in interest rates. Year dummies also account for exogenous shocks which may poten-
tially affect firms' acquisitions decisions (e.g. the 2005 split share structure reform, the 2005 Chinese exchange rate system reform,
and the financial crisis of 2007–2008). vj is an industry-specific effect, which we take into account by including industry dummies.10
vp is a province-specific effect, controlling for uneven developments across different provinces, whichwe take into account by includ-
ing province dummies.11 Finally, εi,t represents an idiosyncratic component.
Given the discrete and limited nature of the dependent variable and the fact that our dataset is a panel, Eq. (1) is initially estimated
using the random-effects Probit estimator, which controls for the vi component of the error term.12 In order to take into account the
potential endogeneity of some of our right-hand side variables, we further use the instrumental variable (IV) Probit method.13 We
instrument Xcash as well as all our financing, efficiency, growth, and firm size variables using their own values lagged twice. Table
3 presents the results. We observe that, regardless of whether we use the random-effects Probit (column 1) or the instrumental var-
iable (IV) Probit method (column 4), the probability of being a bidder increases with the level of excess cash held (Xcash). This sug-
gests that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions than their cash-poor counterparts. Themarginal effects suggest that
holding all other controls equal, a 10 percentage-point increase in Xcash is associatedwith a 1.59–1.89 percentage-point higher prob-
ability of engaging in M&As. This finding is consistent with results reported by Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999) for US firms,
with the free cash flow hypothesis, and with the first part of Hypothesis I.14
Both Tobin's Q and ROA exhibit positivemarginal effects, suggesting that better performing firms aremore likely to engage in acqui-
sitions. Yet,we observe that themarginal effect associatedwith the interaction between these twovariables is negative and significantly
different from zero. This suggests that the probability of being a bidder decreaseswhen firms have higher operating performance (ROA)
as well as valuable investment opportunities (Tobin's Q). In other words, the relation between the likelihood to make acquisitions and
Tobin's Q (ROA) is weaker for firms with higher ROA (Tobin's Q). The reason might be that when a firm has both high growth opportu-
nities and a high operating capacity, it does not need to rely on external investments likeM&As to grow and expand. Expanding via ac-
quisitions is, in fact, more likely to generate a higher price paid for the acquired assets, as well as integration expenses (Margsiri et al.,
2008). In addition, there is a relatively high uncertainty about the synergies created by the acquisitions (Moeller et al., 2005). A thor-
ough discussion of the marginal effects of other regressors included in Eq. (1) is presented in Appendix 4.4.2. Are cash-rich firms subject to tunneling more likely to make acquisitions?
Wenext provide tests of the secondpart of Hypothesis I. In particular, in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Table 3,we investigate a particular
scenario of takeover motivation, in which controlling shareholders tunnel excess cash through M&A transactions.
Following Jiang et al. (2010), we use the ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) to proxy how likely primary shareholders
are of expropriating resources fromminority investors. The “Other Receivables” account is commonly used by Chinese listed firms to
record transactions with related parties. The vague definition of “Other Receivables”, as well as the low level of disclosure require-
ments make manipulation possible. This account is therefore frequently used to cover up tunneling (Li, 2010). According to Jiang et
al. (2010), tens of thousands of inter-corporate loans borrowed by controlling shareholders are classified as “Other Receivables” on
the balance sheets of Chinese listed firms, and represent a large portion of companies' total assets. In our sample, other receivables
constitute about 6.3% on average, and up to around 60% of total assets, confirming the severity of the tunneling problem in China.10 According to the industry classification taken from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), firms in China's listed sector are assigned to one of the fol-
lowing twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & fishing;Mining;Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation &warehouse; Informa-
tion technology;Wholesale & retailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural; Conglomerates; Finance & insurance. Following previous literature, we
exclude the Finance & insurance sector from our study.
11 There are 31 provinces in China: Coastal provinces (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Cen-
tral provinces (Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi); and Western provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Neimenggu,
Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan).
12 To check robustness, we also estimated Eq. (1) using a conditional fixed-effects Logit model and a linear probability model. The former does not require the crucial
assumption thatfirm-specific unobserved effectsmust be independent of the regressors. However, a drawback of thefixed-effects Logit estimator is that all thefirms for
whom the dependent variable is constant over the sample period are dropped in estimation. The estimates based on the conditional Logit estimator and the linear prob-
ability model were similar to those obtained with the random-effects Probit model. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
13 In all our IV specifications, we report the Wald test and the Anderson Rubin test. The former tests the null hypothesis that all regressors are exogenous, while the
latter tests whether the model is identified. In all cases, we reject the null hypothesis that all regressors are exogenous, which suggests it is appropriate to use an IV
estimator. We also find that our model is identified, meaning that the relationship between the included endogenous regressors and the instruments is sufficiently
strong to justify inference from the results.
14 A positive relationship between cash holdings andM&A decisions could also be explained by the financial constraints hypothesis, according to which cash reserves
can increase financially constrained firms' ability to invest without accessing costly external capital markets. In these circumstances, the investments made by firms
with more cash holdings would not necessarily be worse than those undertaken by other firms. Hence, firms who engage in M&As would not necessarily experience
a lower value of cash holdings. By contrast, according to the free cash flow hypothesis, cash-rich firms are more likely to make poor acquisitions, and hence experience
a lower value of cash holdings. In unreported results, following Faulkender and Wang (2006), we observe a decrease in the operating value of cash for acquirer firms
with excess cash. This contradicts the financial constraints explanation for acquisitions by cash-rich firms.We therefore conclude that the positive relationship we ob-
serve between cash holdings and M&A decisions is better explained by the free cash flow hypothesis.
Table 3
Predicting bidders using a Probit model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Xtprobit Xtprobit Xtprobit IVprobit IVprobit IVprobit
Xcash 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.159* 0.047 −0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.355) (0.487) (0.534)
Xcash*Tunneling 0.175** 0.172** 0.382*** 0.426***
(0.084) (0.070) (0.560) (0.593)
Tunneling 0.014** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.038) (0.028)
Return 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** −0.009 −0.008 −0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Tobin 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
ROA 0.126** 0.142*** 0.126** 0.560** 0.706** 0.567**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (1.097) (1.151) (1.105)
ROA*Tobin −0.025* −0.026* −0.024* −0.131** −0.148** −0.132**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.234) (0.247) (0.236)
Sales growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.151 0.137 0.155
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.454) (0.445) (0.455)
NWC −0.019 −0.022 −0.017 −0.003 −0.017 −0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.093) (0.091) (0.093)
Leverage 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.127***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133)
PE 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Shareholding_CEO −0.039*** −0.039*** −0.036*** −0.040*** −0.040*** −0.036***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Blockholders −0.114*** −0.112*** −0.117*** −0.120*** −0.113*** −0.122***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.114) (0.110) (0.114)
SOEs 0.012 0.012 0.023*** 0.011 0.012 0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
No. obs. 19,163 19,163 19,163 16,314 16,314 16,314
ρ 0.18 0.18 0.18
Wald test of exogeneity 0.04** 0.04** 0.05**
Anderson-Rubin 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
chi2 798.4 803.4 846.5 787.0 826.5 837.7
Notes: the specificationswere estimated using the random-effects Probit estimator (xtprobit) in columns 1 to 3, and the instrumental variable Probit method (IVprobit)
in columns 4 to 6, respectively. The dependent variable in all regressions is equal to one if the firm announces a bid in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. Xcash is the un-
expected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW (1999) model estimatedwith the fixed-effects estimator. In columns 2 and 5, we consider a firm as being sub-
ject to tunneling if its ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to
the same industry each year, and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 6,we consider a firm as being subject to tunneling if its blockholder's cashflow ownership is lower than
the controlling ownership in a given year, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2. The table reports marginal effects and standard errors (in pa-
rentheses). Themarginal effects associatedwith the Xcash ∗ Tunneling interaction are computed based on the difference between the averagemarginal effects for Xcash
evaluated in turn for firms more and less likely to tunnel. The marginal effects associated with the ROA ∗ Tobin interaction are computed based on the ratio of the dif-
ference of the average marginal effects relative to ROA evaluated at two infinitesimally close values of Tobin (near the mean), divided by the difference between these
two values (i.e. 0.0001). Time, industry, and province dummieswere included in all specifications. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for
by unobserved heterogeneity.Wald test of exogeneity is the p-value of theWald test of exogeneity of the regressors. Anderson-Rubin is the p-value of a test for whether
themodel is identified. Chi2 represents the likelihood ratio chi-square test of overall significance. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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cifically, we classify a firm as beingmore subject to tunneling in a given year if its OREC in that year falls in the top three deciles of the
distribution of theOREC of all firms operating in the same industry it belongs to. The remainingfirm-years will be considered less sub-
ject to tunneling. Similar results, not reported for brevity, were obtained when a 50% threshold was used.
As an additional check, we also use the separation of the blockholder's controlling right and her/his ownership right as an alterna-
tive proxy for the firm's tunneling incentives. In particular, we construct the dummy variableDIF_Blockholders, which takes value one
if the firm's blockholder's controlling right exceeds its cash flow right in a given year, suggesting the presence of tunneling, and zero
otherwise. According to Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), the incentives of tunneling are great-
er when a firm has implementedmechanisms of separating cash flow and control. This can be explained considering that in these cir-
cumstances, blockholders tend to have exceedingly effective control on the firms, and are able to derivemore benefits from tunneling
activities by only holding a relatively low stake of shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding among firms. We therefore
classify a firm as being subject (not subject) to tunneling in a given year if the blockholder's controlling right is (is not) greater than
his/her ownership right, i.e. if DIF_Blockholders is equal to one (zero).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 present an analysis of the impact of tunneling onmaking acquisition decisions. In particular, this anal-
ysis is undertaken by including in Eq. (1) a dummy variable (Tunneling) equal to 1 in the presence of tunneling, and 0 otherwise, and
an interaction between this dummy variable and excess cash (Xcash). Tunneling is defined based on OREC (column 2) and
136 J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152DIF_Blockholders (column3). The augmented Eq. (1) is estimated using a random-effects Probitmodel. Themarginal effects associated
with the interaction terms in columns 2 and 3 are positive and significant (0.175 and 0.172, respectively), implying that, regardless of
whetherwe useOREC orDIF_Blockholders to proxy for the tendency to expropriate, having excess cash is associatedwith a significant-
ly higher chance of undertaking an acquisition for those firmsmore likely to tunnel compared to those less likely to do so. To put our
Probit results into economic perspective, based on results in column 2, in the presence of a 10 percentage-point increase in Xcash, the
implied probability of making a bid will be 1.75 percentage-point higher for firms that are more likely to tunnel compared with those
less likely to expropriate. In addition, we find significantmarginal effects associatedwith the variable Tunneling, suggesting that prac-
ticing tunneling is associated with a higher likelihood to undertake acquisitions. The results based on the IV-Probit method, reported
in columns 5 and 6, confirm that the positive relationship between Xcash and the likelihood to engage in M&As is stronger for those
firms subject to tunneling. Taken together, these results suggest that Chinese firms tend to take advantage of acquisitions to tunnel
cash to their controlling shareholders, and are in line with the second part of Hypothesis I.
Next, in Table 4, we compare the average percentage of firms conducting acquisition activities, differentiating firms into those that
are more or less likely to tunnel, and those that have Xcash above (High-Xcash) or below (Low-Xcash) zero. We observe a higher pro-
portion of bidders for the High-Xcash firms compared with the Low-Xcash ones, particularly among those firms with a higher likeli-
hood of tunneling (i.e. those firms with a high ratio of other receivables to total assets, or with blockholder's cash flow ownership
lower than the controlling ownership). Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicate that the differences in the mean
and median percentage of firms conducting acquisitions between the High-Xcash and Low-Xcash groups are only significant among
firms characterized by High_Tunneling.15 Hence, the findings in this table once again support Hypothesis I, according to which cash-
rich firms are more likely to undertake M&As, especially if they are subject to tunneling. In other words, our finding suggests that
tunneling is a key reason for M&As in the Chinese context.
4.3. The choice of payment method
4.3.1. The determinants of method of payment
In order to test Hypothesis II, in this section, we initially provide an analysis of the bidder's payment choice. Following Martin
(1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005), our model of the determinants of the method of payment is given by the following
equation:15 Both
quisition
16 We
inclusioPr Paidbycash or stockð Þi;t ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Qi;t þ b2Xcashi;t þ b3CFi;t þ b4Leveragei;t þ b5Blockholdersi;t
þ b6Sharehoding CEOi;t þ b7SOEsi;t þ b8Experiencei;t þ b9Public dealsi;t
þ b10Size ratioi;t þ b11Unfriendlyi;t þ b12Diversifyingi;t
þ b13Completedi;t þ b14Rumori;t þ b15Competingi;t
þ b16FinancialAcquireri;t þ b17FinanicalSponsori;t þ νt þ ν j þ νp þ εi;t
ð2Þwhere the subscript i indexes firms; t indexes years (t = 1998–2015); j indexes industries; and p, provinces. The dependent var-
iable is the bidder's payment choice. Explanatory variables comprise bidder- and deal-specific attributes. Specifically, we measure
the bidder's financial, operational and corporate conditions with Tobin's Q, the market-to-book ratio; Xcash (excess cash); CF (the
ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets); Leverage (the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total
assets); Size (the natural logarithm of total assets); Blockholders (the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder);
Shareholding_CEO (a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm's CEO holds shares in his/her own company, and 0 oth-
erwise); SOEs (a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise); and Ex-
perienced (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bidder has announced at least 3 takeover bids over the five years
period prior to the deal announcement, and 0 otherwise).
Wemeasure the deal's attributeswith Public_deals (a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of publicfirms, and
0 otherwise); Size_ratio (the ratio of the transaction value divided by the bidder's market value four weeks prior to the announce-
ment); Unfriendly (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is not defined as friendly by Thomson Financial SDC,
and 0 otherwise); Diversifying (a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bidder was not in the same industry as the target,
measured using the bidder's and the target's first two digits of the primary SIC code, and 0 otherwise); Completed (a dummy variable,
which takes the value of 1 if the transaction was completed, and 0 otherwise); Rumor (a dummy variable equal to one if the transac-
tion is currently [or originally began as] a rumor, and zero otherwise); Competing (a dummy variable equal to one if a third party
launched an offer for the target while the original bid was pending, and zero otherwise); Financial Acquirer (a dummy variable
equal to one if the bidder is buying a non-financial target company for financial reasons rather than for strategic reasons, and zero oth-
erwise); and Financial Sponsor (a dummy variable equal to one if the deal has any buyout or financial sponsor involvement on either
the buying side or the selling side, and zero otherwise).16the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test also indicate that among the High-Xcash firms, High_Tunneling firms are significantly more likely to undertake ac-
s than their Low_Tunneling counterparts, regardless of how tunneling is measured.
do not include Runup_stock, Runup_market and Sigma_stock in the regressions as this would significantly reduce the numbers of observations. However, the
n of these variables produced qualitatively similar results. These are not presented for brevity, but are available upon request.
Table 4
Excess cash and tunneling.
Constraints criteria Low-Xcash High-Xcash Diff.Mean Diff.Median
OREC
High_Tunneling 15.74% 19.57% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_Tunneling 15.55% 16.11 % 0.34 0. 34
Diff.Mean 0.78 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.78 0.00***
DIF_Blockholders
High_Tunneling 17.82% 20.32% 0.05* 0.05*
Low_Tunneling 14.41% 15.34% 0.12 0.12
Diff.Mean 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.00*** 0.00***
Notes: this table presents the average proportion of bidders in the high- and low-Xcash groups. Xcash is the unexpected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW
(1999) model estimated with the fixed-effects estimator. A firm is considered to be in the high- (low-) Xcash group in a given year if its Xcash is above (below) zero.
High_Tunneling (Low_Tunneling) is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm ismore (less) likely to tunnel, and 0 otherwise. According to the first criterion, we consider
a firm as being subject to tunneling if its ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all
firms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining firm-years will be classified as less likely to tunnel. According to the second criterion, we consider a firm
as being subject to tunneling if its blockholder's cash flowownership is lower than the controlling ownership in a given year. The remaining firm-yearswill be classified
as less likely to tunnel. Diff.Mean and Diff.Median are the p-values associated with the t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of me-
dians of the average proportion of cash payments between high- and low-Xcash groups and between High- and Low-Tunneling groups (medians are not reported for
brevity). *, *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
137J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152Our estimates of Eq. (2) are reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table 5. Specifically, in columns 1 and 3, we use a Probit model in which
the dependent variable is 1 if the deal is financed only by cash in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. By contrast, the specifications in col-
umns 2 and 4 are estimated using an ordered Probit estimator, whereby the dependent variable takes value of 1 if the acquisition in
year t + 1 is stock-financed; 2, if it is mixed-financed; and 3, if it is cash-financed.We estimate all regressions by accounting for clus-
tering, which takes into account the intra-class correlation within the same firm.
It is noteworthy that if poor financial or corporate conditions, which play a crucial role in payment considerations, also prevent
some potential bidders from taking part in acquisition activity, then we may understate the importance of the determinants of the
choice of paymentmethod. As shown in Table 2, there are significant differences in firm characteristics between bidders and non-bid-
ders, which suggest that our financial variables could be determined endogenously. Additionally, the method of payment could be a
matter of choice on the part of the bidder. To control for this selection bias, we implement Heckman's (1976, 1979) two-step proce-
dure and report the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. Specifically, in thefirst stage, based on Eq. (1), we estimate a selection (Prob-
it) model for the probability of making a bid for each firm-year. We then calculate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. In the
second stage, we include the inverseMills ratio in the second-step equation to correct for a potential selection problem in our sample.
If the inverseMill's ratio does not carry a significant sign, thenwe can confirm that the selection bias does not have a significant impact
on the second-stage equation for the choice of payment methods (Heckman, 1976, 1979).17
Weobserve that thebidder's stock valuation (Tobin's Q) has a significant andnegativemarginal effect in all specifications, suggesting
that better investment prospects are associatedwith a lower likelihood of cash payments. Focusing on columns1 and 2,we observe that
themarginal effect associatedwith Tobin's Q is−0.020,which suggests that a one standard deviation (1.5) increase in the bidder's stock
valuation is associated with a 3.0 percentage-point decline in the probability of the firm using cash in acquisitions. This finding is con-
sistent with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, according to which acquiring firms with higher investment opportunities
would rather not spend cash in acquisitions since they face higher opportunity costs of holding cash. It is also consistent with the first
part of Hypothesis II. A thorough discussion of the other determinants of the payment method is presented in Appendix 5.
4.3.2. Financial constraints and method of payment
In order to test the second part of Hypothesis II, we next investigate whether the opportunity costs of cash holdings, as measured
by the sensitivity of cash payment decisions to growth opportunities (Tobin's Q), is higher for firms that face higher financial con-
straints compared to their financially healthier counterparts. To this end, an interaction term between Tobin's Q and a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm faces a high degree of financing constraints is added to Eq. (2). If the second part of Hypothesis II is satisfied, then
the marginal effect on this interaction term should be negative and statistically significant.
Based on existing literature, we use five different criteria to proxy for the level of financial constraints that bidders face. The first
criterion is size, whereby it is assumed that small firms usually do not have sufficient net worth and collateral values, as well as a suf-
ficiently long track record comparedwith large firms. Thus, theywill bemore vulnerable to asymmetric information in credit markets
andwill facemore difficulties in obtaining external financing (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Beck et al., 2005; Clementi and Hopenhayn,
2006; Guariglia, 2008).
Second, followingKaplan and Zingales (1997) andWhited andWu (2006), we construct theKZ andWW indexes to proxy for firm-
specific levels of financial constraints. A firm is more likely to be financially constrained if it has a higher level of the KZ orWW index.
These two indexes are described in detail in Appendix 2.17 As we find negative and significant coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios in Table 5, we reject the null hypothesis of independence of the second-stage equations
from the selection equations, suggesting the prevalence of self-selection.
Table 5
Determinants of the method of payment taking financial constraints into consideration.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Oprobit Probit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit
Total Assets No. of Employees KZ WW Dividend Paying
Tobin −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.001 −0.011** −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.008*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
High_FC*Tobin −0.021*** −0.010* −0.013* −0.003 −0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Xcash 0.119 0.070 0.012 −0.029 −0.022 −0.024 −0.049 −0.028 −0.059
(0.088) (0.084) (0.088) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084)
CF 0.479*** 0.448*** 0.344*** 0.319*** 0.255** 0.276*** 0.288*** 0.308*** 0.236**
(0.113) (0.101) (0.113) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104)
Leverage 0.019 0.016 −0.042 −0.041 −0.040 −0.046 −0.017 −0.036 −0.021
(0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Blockholders 0.017 0.044 0.068 0.095** 0.083* 0.091** 0.089** 0.090** 0.080*
(0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Shareholding_CEO 0.041** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.058***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
SOEs −0.007 −0.002 −0.025 −0.019 −0.018 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.018
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Experienced 0.057*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.033** 0.027* 0.031** 0.033** 0.032** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Public_deals −0.107** −0.124*** −0.133*** −0.147*** −0.140*** −0.146*** −0.150*** −0.148*** −0.146***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Size_ratio −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unfriendly −0.113*** −0.105*** −0.113*** −0.105*** −0.103*** −0.108*** −0.105*** −0.105*** −0.103***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Diversifying 0.003 −0.001 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Completed −0.112*** −0.119*** −0.110*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.114***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Rumors 0.010 −0.004 −0.026 −0.040 −0.032 −0.038 −0.037 −0.040 −0.032
(0.131) (0.133) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.126)
Competing −0.094*** −0.108*** −0.098*** −0.111*** −0.110*** −0.114*** −0.112*** −0.111*** −0.111***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Financial Acquirer 0.363*** 0.360*** 0.345*** 0.342*** 0.350*** 0.345*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 0.341***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.074) (0.072) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Financial Sponsor −0.201*** −0.218*** −0.193*** −0.211*** −0.213*** −0.208*** −0.210*** −0.211*** −0.208***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Inverse Mills Ratio −0.241*** −0.228*** −0.185*** −0.219*** −0.226*** −0.216*** −0.213***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)
No. obs. 3035 3043 3035 3043 3043 3030 3043 3042 3043
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
chi2 388.8 2082.7 416.8 2143.6 2006.1 2150.9 2271.0 2140.5 2359.1
Notes: the specifications in columns 1 and 3were estimated using thepooled Probit estimator. In this case, the dependent variable is one if the deal wasfinanced only by
cash in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. The remaining specifications were estimated using the ordered Probit estimator. In this case, the dependent variable takes a
value of 1 for all stock deals, 2 for mixed deals, and 3 for all cash deals, in year t + 1. In columns 5 to 9, we include an interaction term between Tobin's Q and a
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the firm faces a relatively high levels of financial constraints (High_FC). Specifically, in columns 5 and 6, we consider a firm as
financially constrained if its size (measured by total assets or number of employees) lies in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values
of all firms belonging to the same industry in each year, and 0 otherwise. In columns 7 and 8, we consider a firm as financially constrained if its KZ or WW index
falls in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year, and 0 otherwise. In column 9, we con-
sider a firm as financially constrained if it is not paying dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2. The table reports mar-
ginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses). The marginal effects associated with the Tobin ∗ High_FC interaction are computed based on the difference between
the average marginal effects for Tobin evaluated in turn at High_FC = 1 and High_FC = 0. Time, industry, and province dummies were included in all specifications.
Apart from columns 1 and 2, we use Heckman's (1976, 1979) two-stage approach by introducing the Inverse Mills Ratio into each regression to take account of the se-
lection bias. Chi2 represents the likelihood ratio chi-square test of overall significance. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
138 J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152Third, prior literature documents that financially constrained firms tend to cut or reduce dividend payout to finance their de-
sired investment projects or cover their debt obligations (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Almeida et
al., 2004; Almeida and Campello, 2007). We therefore expect firms that pay no dividends to face higher capital market
imperfections.
Following this literature, we classify a firm as facing a relatively high degree of financial constraints in a given year if its size (mea-
sured by total real assets or number of employees) falls in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of the size of all firms operating
in the same industry as thatfirm, in that given year (columns 5 and 6 of Table 5); if itsKZ orWW index in that year falls in the top three
deciles of the distribution of the indexes of all firms operating in the same industry as that firm, in that given year (columns 7 and 8);
139J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152and if the firm has not made any cash dividend payment in the year (column 9).18,19 We then construct a dummy variable (High_FC),
which is equal to 1 in a given year if the firm is likely to face a relatively high degree of financial constraints, and 0 otherwise.
The results of this test appear in columns 5 to 9 of Table 5. Ordered Probit estimates of themodified Eq. (2) are presented,whereby
the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the acquisition in year t+ 1 is stock-financed, 2 if it is mixed-financed, and 3 if it is cash-
financed. The inverseMills ratio is included in all specifications to control for selection problems. Once again,we observe that Tobin's Q
has a significant and negative marginal effect in most specifications. Furthermore, in line with the second part of Hypothesis II, we
observe that the marginal effects associated with the interactions between Tobin's Q and High_FC are generally negative and statisti-
cally significant regardless of the criterion used tomeasure financial constraints.20 This suggests that in the presence of a rising Tobin's
Q, compared to their financially healthier counterparts, financially constrained bidders are more likely to save cash and use stock to
pay for the acquisitions. To put our Ordered Probit results into economic perspective, based on column 5, if the bidder's Tobin's Q
rises by one standard deviation (1.5), the implied probability of using cash as payment drops by an additional 3.1 percentage points
for firmsmore likely to face financial constraints, relative to financially healthier firms. This finding can be explained by the opportu-
nity cost of holding cash hypothesis, according to which financially constrained acquirers with better investment opportunities value
cashmore than their financially healthier counterparts (Alshwer et al., 2011). Therefore, since holdingmore cash givesmore financial
flexibility and avoids the high opportunity cost of forgoing positive net present value (NPV) projects in the future, thesefirmsprefer to
use stock tofinance the deals. By contrast, firmswith easier access to financialmarketsmay not have such a strong preference for pay-
ment methods in acquisitions, since they may easily fund their current or future investments using debt or equity.
As a further test of the second part of Hypothesis II, we next provide descriptive statistics of the average proportion of cash pay-
ments for different categories of bidding firms (Table 6). Specifically, based on firms' financial conditions and Tobin's Q, we partition
bidding firm-years into 4 sub-groups: Group 1 (financially constrained firmswith low Q), Group 2 (financially constrained firmswith
high Q), Group 3 (financially unconstrained firmswith low Q), and Group 4 (financially unconstrained firmswith high Q).21We then
compute the average proportion of cash payments (Payment_cash) across the four sub-samples. We observe that regardless of how
financing constraints are measured, for the financially constrained group, the average percentage of cash transactions for the low Q
group is much higher than the one for the high Q group. The differences in thesemeans andmedians between the two groups are al-
ways significant at the 1% level.22
These statistics suggest that relatively financially constrained bidders with low investment opportunities are more likely to use
cash to finance their acquisitions. This finding is in line with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al., 2011),
according to which, especially for firms facing high investment opportunities, financial constraints increase the opportunity cost of
holding cash. It also provides further support to the second part of Hypothesis II.4.4. The valuation effects of takeovers
4.4.1. Short-run analysis
4.4.1.1. Abnormal returns for different methods of payment. In this section, we use traditional short-window event studies to investigate
market reactions of acquirers' stocks across different methods of payment. Table 7 displays bidders' cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) within the three-day (t = −1, +1) and five-day (t = −2, +2) windows of a merger announcement over the period
1998–2015.23 In line with Chi et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2015), and Black et al. (2015), for all bidders (n= 2887), the cumulative ab-
normal returns of the acquirers over a three-day and five-day event window are statistically significant and positive, taking values of
1.85% and 2.16%, respectively. Significant and positive abnormal returns suggest that Chinese stockmarkets react positively to the an-
nouncements of bidding. This could be due to the fact that although acquisitions are more likely to destroy value, they may be less
wasteful than investing internally in loss-making projects, especially when the acquirers have substantial cash flows and few growth
opportunities.24 Alternatively, Chi et al. (2011) attribute the positive announcement returns to the low M&A competition in China.18 Given the significant capital market imperfections characterizing the Chinese market, the majority of Chinese companies pay stock dividends rather than cash div-
idends (Lin et al., 2010).
19 The reason why we use a relatively small (30%) threshold to classify firms as facing relatively high financial constraints is that Chinese acquirers are typically large
firms and are therefore less likely to be affected by capital market imperfections. However, similar results were obtainedwhen using 25% and 50% thresholds. For brev-
ity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
20 One exception is observed in column 8, whichmakes use of theWW index to measure the degree of financing constraints faced by firms. In this case, themarginal
effect associated with the interaction is not statistically significant.
21 We classify afirm into thehigh- (low-)Q group in a given year if its Tobin's Q is above (below) themedian value of theQ of allfirms operating in the same industry in
that year.
22 Additionally, we observe that regardless of how financing constraints aremeasured, for the high-Q group, the average percentage of cash transactions for thefinan-
cially constrained group ismuch lower than the one for the financially unconstrained group, with the differences inmeans andmedians being statistically significant at
the 1% level.
23 See Appendix 2 for details on how bidders' (cumulative) abnormal returns are constructed.When studying valuation effects, we exclude 1109 deals due to relevant
trading information on the acquirer beingmissing. Furthermore, as an additional sensitivity test, we followGolubov et al. (2012) andwinsorize the 1% tails of the CARs'
distribution to control for outliers. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
24 A firmwith limited growth prospects could benefit by taking on unanticipated investment opportunities such asM&As to reduce free cash flow problems and ease
overinvestment (Smith and Kim, 1994).
Table 6
Choice of method of payment taking growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) and financial constraints into account.
Constraints criterion Low-Q High-Q Diff.
Mean
Diff.
Median
Size (Real assets)
High_FC 84.21% 66.01% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 86.49% 84.37% 0.10* 0.10*
Diff. Mean 0.53 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.53 0.00***
Size (Employees)
High_FC 86.00% 68.97% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 86.36% 82.11% 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff. Mean 0.87 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.87 0.00***
KZ
High_FC 85.91% 74.78% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 86.77% 85.30% 0.52 0.52
Diff. Mean 0.62 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.62 0.00***
WW
High_FC 83.73% 73.88% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 88.42% 86.39% 0.26 0.26
Diff. Mean 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.00*** 0.00***
Payout
High_FC 81.12% 68.80% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 89.19% 85.50% 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff. Mean 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff. Median 0.00*** 0.00***
Notes: this table presents the average proportion of cash payments (Payment_cash) differentiatingfirms between
High- and Low-Q groups, and high and low levels of financial constraints. A firm is considered to be in the High-
(Low-) Q group in a given year if its Tobin's Q lies above (below) themedian value of theQs of all firms operating
in its same industry in a given year.High_FC and Low_FC are dummyvariables, equal to 1 respectively if thefirm is
more likely to face high and low financial constraints relatively to all firms operating in the same industry they
belong to in a given year, and0 otherwise.With thefirst two criteria,we consider afirmasfinancially constrained
if its size (measured by total assets or number or employees) lies in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of
the corresponding values of all firms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining firm-years will be
classified as facing a low level of financial constraints. For the KZ andWW indexes, we consider a firm as finan-
cially constrained if itsKZ orWW index lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding index-
es for allfirmsbelonging to the same industry in a given year. The remainingfirm-yearswill be classified as facing
lowfinancial constraints. For the last criterion (Payout),we partitionfirms according to their dividendpayout sta-
tus. Specifically, a firmwill be classified as facing low financial constraints if it is paying dividends in a given year,
and as facing high financial constraints, otherwise.Diff.Mean andDiff.Median are the p-values associatedwith the
t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test for equality ofmeans and equality ofmedians of the average proportion of
cash payment between High- and Low-Q groups, and High_FC and Low_FC groups (medians are not reported for
brevity). *, *** indicate significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
140 J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152When we partition bidders on the basis of their methods of payment, we see that stock bidders generate themost significant and
largest abnormal returns, regardless of the eventwindows used (CAR3= 11.67%; CAR5= 15.13%; n= 265). Bidderswithmixed pay-
ments follow (CAR3= 0.88%, CAR5= 0.57%, n= 137), and cash bidders are last (CAR3= 0.86%, CAR5= 0.87%, n= 2485). Both theTable 7
Cumulative abnormal returns by methods of payment between January 1998 and December 2015.
Stock only Mixed PYMT Cash only All Bidders Diff.Mean Diff.Median
CAR3 11.67%⁎⁎⁎ 0.88%⁎ 0.86%⁎⁎⁎ 1.85%⁎⁎⁎
(p-value) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
No. obs. 265 137 2485 2887
CAR5 15.13%⁎⁎⁎ 0.57%⁎⁎ 0.87%⁎⁎⁎ 2.16%⁎⁎⁎
(p-value) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
No. obs. 265 137 2485 2887
Notes: cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using themarketmodel with parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to
the deal announcement for different day event windows around the announcement (day 0). CAR3 and CAR5 are the average cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day
(−1, +1) and 5-day (−2, +2) event windows, respectively, where 0 denotes the announcement.Diff.Mean and Diff.Median are the p-values associatedwith the t-test
and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of medians of the cumulative abnormal returns between cash and stock acquisitions (medians are
not reported for brevity). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
141J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test indicate that the differences in themean andmedian CARs between cash and stock acquisitions
are statistically significant.
In short, the results show that the market has different perceptions of acquisitions depending on the methods of payment used.
The lowest announcement returns associated with cash payments are in line with Black et al.'s (2015) findings on the Chinese econ-
omy, aswell aswithHypothesis III.We attribute this to the fact that, due to the lower opportunity costs of holding cash, cash-acquiring
firms are more likely to waste cash on unprofitable acquisitions. Other factors may also contribute to a negative market reaction for
cash acquisitions. First, bidders have a greater probability to offer high acquisition premiums for cash transactions (Fishman, 1989).
Given the high degree of information asymmetry prevalent in the Chinese stockmarket, cash payments aremore likely to be accepted
by target firms only if cash offers are attractive or exceed their true value. Second, when stock payments are used in takeover trans-
actions, taxes are deferred until the stock is sold. However, cash payments face immediate capital gains tax implications. Thus, the tax-
deferred option in stock may be valued by the market.
Fig. 1 presents a plot of the average acquirer's cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) for the bidding firms in the event window (t=
−30, +30). We observe that during the event window, the CAAR starts to decline, and hits a trough around day−12. This is then
followed by a picking up until day +4, and a slight decline between day +5 and +30. The most sizeable CAAR increase occurs be-
tween day−5 and +4, suggesting more significant stock price reactions around the announcement day.
Fig. 2 shows the CAARs for the bidding firms in the event window (t=−30, +30), differentiating by method of payment. Spe-
cifically, Panels A, B and C report the average acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns for all stock deals, mixed deals and, all cash
deals respectively. Panel A shows a positive price reaction for the pure stock acquisition announcement. In particular, there is a signif-
icant increase between days−2 and+5. The CAAR is relatively flat prior to and following this period. Panel B also shows a generally
positive price reaction for the acquisition announcements with mixed payments. However, we observe that the CAAR starts falling
after day +2, and, over the event window, it starts to drift down becoming negative in day +20. For the pure cash acquisitions in
Panel C, the CAAR is negative 10 days before the announcement. It then starts to pick up reaching its maximum value of 1.5% on
day 1. After that, during the post-announcement period between days +1 and+30, it decreases marginally. Overall, the positive re-
action for the stock deals is significantly larger than that for deals financed with cash or mixed payments.
Combined, the results in Figs. 1 and2 suggest that information aboutM&As starts to leak to themarket before the official announce-
ment (around day−12). In addition, the lowest CAAR is associatedwith cash payments, while themarket reaction is most positive for
stock announcements, which is entirely consistent with Hypothesis III and with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis.25
4.4.1.2. Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidders' CARs. Next, we further investigate the relationship between method of payment
and bidders' abnormal returns using a multivariate OLS regression analysis with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at the firm level. Following Golubov et al. (2012) and Black et al. (2015), our baseline regression model is:25 If w
undertaCARi;t ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Payment cashi;t þ b2Qi;t þ b3Xcashi;t
þ b4CFi;t þ b5Leveragei;t þ b6Blockholdersi;t þ b7Sharehoding CEOi;t
þ b8SOEsi;t þ b9Experiencei;t þ b10Public dealsi;t þ b11Size ratio
þ b12Unfriendlyi;t þ b13Diversifyingi;t þ b14Completedi;t þ b15Rumori;t
þ b16Competingi;t þ b17FinancialAcquireri;t þ b18FinanicalSponsori;t
þ b19Runup stocki;t þ b20Runup marketi;t þ b21Sigma stocki;t þ vt þ vj þ vp þ εi;t
ð3Þwhere the independent variables are bidder-, target-, deal-, and market-specific factors. The former include the payment dummy
(Payment_cash), Tobin's Q (Q), excess cash (Xcash), cash flow (CF), leverage (Leverage), the percentage of shares controlled by the
largest shareholder (Blockholders), an indicator of CEO shareholding (Shareholding_CEO), a state ownership dummy (SOEs), and an
indicator of experience of the bidder (Experienced). Target-specific factors include an indicator of the target's listing status
(Public_deals). Deal-specific-factors include the relative size of the deal (Size_ratio), an indicator of acquisition attitude (Unfriend-
ly), an indicator of whether the bidder's and target's industries coincide (Diversifying), an indicator of deal completion (Complet-
ed), an indicator of rumored deals (Rumors), an indicator of competing bids (Competing), an indicator of financial bidder (Financial
Acquirer), and an indicator of any buyouts and financial sponsor involvement (Financial Sponsor). Lastly, market-specific factors
include stock performance prior to the announcement (Runup_stock), market performance (Runup_market), and risk prior to
the announcement (Sigma_stock). In all specifications, we also incorporate year, industry and province fixed-effects.
Table 8 presents the results of this analysis, which is based on the Heckman two-stage procedure to control for the self-selection
bias. Specifically, as in Section 4.3.1, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation based on a selection (Probit) model (Eq.
(1)) for the probability ofmaking a bid.We then include the inverseMills ratios in theOLS regressions of the bidders' CARs (Eq. (3)) to
correct for the potential selection problem in our sample. The dependent variable in the regression is the five-day cumulative abnor-
mal return (CAR5) in columns 1 and 3, and the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR3) in columns 2 and 4, respectively.
As shown in columns 1 and 2, after controlling for various bidder-, target-, deal-, and market-specific factors, we find that the
coefficient on Payment_cash is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which is in line with Hypothesis III and with the
opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis. Keeping other factors constant, the magnitude of the coefficients in columns 1 and 2e separate deals according to the dummy Payment_cash, we find a significantly more positive market reaction for non-cash acquisitions compared to the ones
ken with cash payments.
Fig. 2. Acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns (−30, +30) differentiating across methods of payment. This figure shows the average cumulative abnormal
returns (CAARs) between January 1998 andDecember 2015, for the bidding firm in the (−30,+30) eventwindow,where 0 denotes the announcement, differentiating
across methods of payment. The abnormal returns are calculated as the differences between the realized returns and the market model benchmark returns, with the
parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement. Panels A, B and C report the average acquirers' cumu-
lative abnormal returns for all stock deals, mixed deals, and all cash deals, respectively.
Fig. 1. Acquirers' cumulative average abnormal return (−30, +30). This figure shows the average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) between January 1998 and De-
cember 2015, for the bidding firm in the (−30, +30) event window, where 0 denotes the announcement. The abnormal returns are calculated as the differences be-
tween the realized returns and the market model benchmark returns, with the parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to
the deal announcement.
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Table 8
Determinants of the short-run cumulative abnormal returns of the bidders.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR5 CAR3 CAR5 CAR3
Payment_cash −0.074*** −0.059*** −0.035*** −0.035***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
Tobin 0.006*** 0.004** 0.017*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Payment_cash *Tobin −0.016*** −0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Xcash 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.010
(0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023)
CF 0.089** 0.076** 0.089** 0.076**
(0.045) (0.033) (0.044) (0.032)
Leverage 0.020 0.025** 0.019 0.024**
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011)
Blockholders 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Shareholding_CEO −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
SOEs −0.009** −0.007** −0.008* −0.006*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Experienced −0.008** −0.005 −0.007* −0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Public_deals 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.005
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014)
Size_ratio 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unfriendly 0.000 −0.002 0.001 −0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Diversifying 0.010*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.005*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Completed 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Rumors −0.053* −0.030 −0.049 −0.028
(0.029) (0.020) (0.033) (0.022)
Competing 0.011* 0.007 0.010 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Financial Acquirer −0.051** −0.029* −0.043** −0.024
(0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Financial Sponsor 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.030***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
Runup_stock −0.036*** −0.026*** −0.034*** −0.024***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Runup_market 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.011
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Sigma_stock 0.050 0.118 0.011 0.094
(0.107) (0.078) (0.105) (0.077)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.016 0.014 0.019 0.016
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
No. obs. 2304 2304 2304 2304
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.19
Notes: this table presents results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions for the cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day (columns 2 and 4) and 5-day event (columns 1
and 3)window, expressed in percentage terms. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns, which are calculated using themarketmodel with parameters
estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement, for different day eventwindows around the announcement (day 0).
All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.We use the Heckman's (1976, 1979) two-stage approach by introducing the InverseMills Ratio into each regression to take
account of the selection bias. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors, which are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Time dummies and
industry dummies were included in all specifications. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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respectively.
We also observe that the bidder's announcement returns (CAR5 and CAR3) are significantly and positively associated with Tobin's
Q. This suggests that themarket reacts positively to increases in bidders' investment opportunities. In columns 3 and 4, we introduce
in Eq. (3) an interaction term between Tobin's Q and Payment_cash. We observe that this additional term exhibits a negative coeffi-
cient. In column 3, the magnitude of the interaction term is−0.016, while the magnitude of the coefficient on Tobin's Q is 0.017.
This suggests that when Tobin's Q rises by one standard deviation (1.5), the announcement returns (CAR5) will rise by 2.6 percentage
points for non-cash bidders (0.017 ∗ 1.5), but only by around 0.15 percentage point [(0.017− 0.016) ∗ 1.5] for cash bidders. This can
be explained considering that cash bidders with valuable investment opportunities are likely to face a lower opportunity cost of
144 J. Yang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 54 (2019) 128–152holding cash than the average cash bidder, aswell as higher agency costs (e.g. tunneling). The negative coefficient associatedwith the
interaction between Tobin's Q and Payment_cash also suggests that a higher Tobin's Q reinforces the negative association between
Payment_cash and the CARs. In other words, if bidders with valuable investment opportunities use cash to finance acquisitions,
they suffer more from negative market reactions.
A thorough discussion of other determinants of bidders' CARs is presented in Appendix 6. In summary, our results on abnormal
announcement returns support Hypothesis III, according to which, in the Chinese context, stock bidders experience more positive
reactions than cash bidders.4.4.2. Long-run analysis
4.4.2.1. Time record of bidders' annual operating performance. In the previous section, we found that cash-paying bidders have lower
abnormal announcement returns than stock-paying ones, suggesting that the market anticipates weaker future performance for
the former. In order to provide greater insights into the relationship between a firm's participation in acquisitions and long-run per-
formance, Table 9 presents the change in operating performance for bidders characterized by differentmethods of payment. First, fol-
lowing Healy et al. (1992), Harford (1999) and Linn and Switzer (2001), we use the return on assets (ROA) and cash flow (CF) to
measure bidders' operating performance. According to Barber and Lyon (1996), in order to assess operating performance of corpora-
tions following major events or decisions, it is important to design a test which controls for firms with similar pre-merger
performance.26
To this end, first, in Panels A and B of Table 9, we followHeron and Lie (2002) and analyze bidders' operating performance relative
to the median performance of firms in the same industry. Specifically, industry-adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted
ROA, and industry-adjusted CF) is constructed as the difference between a bidder's operating performance (CF or ROA) and that of
the median firm in the same industry in a given year.
Second, in the spirit of Rau andVermaelen (1998) andHarford (1999), in Panels C andD,wematch sample firms to control for size
and cash levels. Specifically, performance-adjusted operating performance (performance-adjusted ROA, and performance-adjusted CF)
for a given bidder is constructed by subtracting the bidder's operating performance from the median performance of the firms in the
same portfolio.27 These performance-matchedmethods allow us tomake a direct comparison between the operating performance of
firms with a similar pre-event performance that engage in acquisitions and those that do not. This method therefore helps us to pro-
vide better inference about how merger deals impact bidders' operating performance.
In the columns labeled All Bidders, we report mean and median values of adjusted-ROA and adjusted-CF from year−2 to year +2
relative to the year of the acquisition announcement for the total sample.We observe that Chinese bidders generally experience a de-
crease in performance from year−1 to year+2, regardless of whetherwe use adjusted-CF or adjusted-ROA and regardless of whether
we undertake industry or performance adjustment. P-values associated with both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test show
that, in general, these mean and median changes from year−1 to year +2 are statistically significant.
To check whether operating performance is affected by the method of payment, we next break the bidders down into three sub-
samples: Stock only, Mixed Payment, and Cash only. We find that the pre-acquisition operating performance is higher for bidders in
cash-financed deals comparedwith those in stock-financed deals, regardless of whether we use adjusted-ROA or adjusted-CF. Howev-
er, cash bidders underperform stock bidders in the post-acquisition periods.28 It is interesting to note that only cash bidders showpos-
itive adjusted performance before acquisitions, while experiencing a decrease in adjusted performance between year−1 and year
+2. For these deals, both the t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test significantly reject the null hypothesis that themean andmedian
differences in adjusted performance before and after acquisitions equal zero at the 1% level. Based on themagnitude of the change in
adjusted-ROA in Panel A, the decrease in bidders' adjusted performance between year−1 and year+2 is 0.7%,which is 7 times as high
as the value of the adjusted-ROA in year 0 (0.1%). This figure is economically significant. Thesefindings can be interpreted in twoways.
First, good performance prior to the bid may allow bidders to accumulate substantial cash, which may enhance management discre-
tion, as a result of whichmanagersmay then undertake low-returnmergers for their private interests. Second, it is possible that due to
a lack of investment opportunities, cash bidders with a better operating performance prior to the takeover face lower opportunity
costs of cash holdings and tend to use M&As as a way of spending excess cash.
On the contrary, we find that there is a significant increase in bidders' adjusted performance from year−1 to year +2 for stock-
financed deals. Based on themagnitude of the change in adjusted-ROA in Panel A, the increase in adjusted performance between year
−1 and year +2 is 2.7%, which is about 1.5 times as high as the absolute value of the adjusted-ROA in year 0 (1.9%). This figure is also26 In an event study of operating performance, Barber and Lyon (1996) find that a test statistic is consistent andwell specified onlywhen sample firms arematched to
appropriate benchmarks to control for abnormal firm performance prior to the event. For instance, if an industry has experienced abnormal growth in CF during a cer-
tain time period, it is highly likely that the samplefirms in this industry experience a similar growth inCF. Assuming that afirm in this industry engages in an acquisition
during the period, if we calculate the change of the firm's real performance due to the merger event without an appropriate benchmark (e.g. an industry benchmark),
this firm would appear to have an inflated change of operating performance.
27 Following Fama and French (1993), in each year, we partition firms into 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted with the cash ratio to control for
abnormal firm characteristics prior to the event.
28 The performance of mixed-payment acquisitions falls between the performance of cash and stock acquisitions: Mixed-payment bidders generally experience a de-
crease in performance before they take over other firms (i.e. from year−2 to year−1). This is then followed by an improvement in the post-acquisition period from
year 0 to year +2.
Table 9
Changes in industry-adjusted operating performance.
Panel A: (industry-adjusted ROA, control group of firms based on industry)
Adjusted-ROA Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.025 −0.012 503 −0.028 −0.016 198 0.002 0.001 3092 −0.003 −0.001 3793
Year (-1) −0.022 −0.012 500 −0.034 −0.014 201 0.002 0.001 3217 −0.003 −0.001 3918
Year (0) −0.019 −0.008 508 −0.026 −0.011 203 0.001 0 3280 −0.003 −0.001 3991
Year (1) −0.011 −0.003 391 −0.017 −0.007 187 −0.002 −0.001 2968 −0.004 −0.002 3546
Year (2) 0.005 −0.001 306 −0.009 −0.003 176 −0.005 −0.003 2687 −0.004 −0.003 3169
D(-1/2) 0.027 0.011 0.025 0.011 −0.007 −0.004 −0.001 −0.002
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05** 0.00***
Panel B: (industry-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on industry)
Adjusted-CF Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.024 −0.013 500 −0.027 −0.02 197 0.002 0.002 3076 −0.003 −0.001 3773
Year (-1) −0.021 −0.012 496 −0.033 −0.012 200 0.002 0.002 3201 −0.002 0 3897
Year (0) −0.018 −0.01 506 −0.024 −0.011 203 0.001 0 3268 −0.003 −0.001 3977
Year(1) −0.011 −0.003 389 −0.018 −0.011 185 −0.002 0 2962 −0.004 −0.001 3536
Year (2) 0.005 0.002 305 −0.011 −0.006 173 −0.004 −0.001 2679 −0.004 −0.001 3157
D(-1/2) 0.026 0.014 0.022 0.006 −0.006 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00***
Panel C: (performance-adjusted ROA, control group of firms based on size and cash levels)
Adjusted-ROA Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.02 −0.008 503 −0.02 −0.009 198 0.003 0.002 3090 −0.001 0 3791
Year (-1) −0.018 −0.009 500 −0.028 −0.01 201 0.003 0.001 3217 −0.001 0 3918
Year (0) −0.015 −0.006 508 −0.019 −0.007 203 0.002 0 3280 −0.001 −0.001 3991
Year (1) −0.007 −0.001 391 −0.012 −0.003 187 −0.001 0 2968 −0.002 −0.001 3546
Year (2) 0.01 0.004 306 −0.005 −0.004 176 −0.003 0 2687 −0.002 0 3169
D(-1/2) 0.019 0.013 0.023 0.006 −0.006 −0.001 −0.001 0
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.09* 0.04**
Panel D: (performance-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on size and cash levels)
Adjusted-CF Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.019 −0.01 500 −0.019 −0.013 197 0.004 0.001 3074 0 0 3771
Year (-1) −0.017 −0.01 496 −0.027 −0.01 200 0.004 0.001 3201 −0.001 0 3897
Year (0) −0.014 −0.009 506 −0.018 −0.007 203 0.002 0 3268 −0.001 −0.001 3977
Year (1) −0.007 −0.001 389 −0.012 −0.005 185 −0.001 −0.001 2962 −0.002 −0.001 3536
Year (2) 0.01 0.009 305 −0.008 −0.005 173 −0.003 −0.001 2679 −0.002 −0.001 3157
D(-1/2) 0.018 0.010 0.019 0.005 −0.007 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00***
Notes: this table presents annual mean and median values of adjusted return on assets (adjusted-ROA) in Panels A and C, and adjusted cash flow (adjusted-CF) in Panels B
and D, from year−2 to year +2 relative to the year of acquisition. In Panels A and B, adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA or CF) is measured by the
difference between a firm's ROA (CF) and that of themedian firm in the industry in which that firm operates, in a given year. In Panels C and D, adjusted operating perfor-
mance (performance-adjusted ROA or CF) is constructed by subtracting the benchmark performance (the median performance of the firms in the same portfolio) from the
firm's operating performance in each year,where the benchmark performance is constructed as 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interactedwith the cash ratio
(Fama and French, 1993). D (−1/2) is the change of adjusted operating performance fromyear−1 to year+2.Weprovide the t-test and theWilcoxon signed-rank test for
differences in means and medians of adjusted operating performance from year−1 to year +2. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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mance for stock acquisitions is in line with our previous finding of higher announcement returns.
Put together, ourfindings confirm the underperformance of cash deals comparedwith stock deals in terms of abnormal announce-
ment returns documented in the previous section.2929 The under-performance of cash acquisitions contradicts the asymmetric information explanation proposed by most US and UK studies. According to this explana-
tion, stock payments are preferred by overvalued bidders when purchasing target firms characterized by relative undervaluation. Furthermore, stock payments are
widely interpreted as a negative signal as they shift part of the (possibly negative) future returns to the new shareholders. By contrast, when bidders have favorable
private information about the high value of the target (potential synergies), they use cash to preempt potential competing bidders. Cash payments signal therefore pos-
itive information. Hence, on average, stock-financedmergers underperform cash-financed ones (Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Loughran and Anand, 1997; Andrade et
al., 2001; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Abhyankar et al., 2005).
Table 10
Regressions of industry-adjusted operating performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Panel A: (industry-adjusted ROA, control group of firms based on industry)
ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y
Intercept −0.006 0.009 −0.007 −0.002 −0.004*** −0.010*** −0.004*** −0.007***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_ROA 0.238*** 0.258*** 0.326*** 0.417*** 0.382*** 0.450*** 0.349*** 0.396***
(0.091) (0.093) (0.102) (0.083) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029)
No. obs. 383 295 185 171 2901 2497 3469 2963
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.15
F-value 6.93 7.67 10.26 24.98 113.44 194.70 124.99 192.83
Panel B: (industry-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on industry)
CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y
Intercept −0.007 0.008 −0.008 −0.005 −0.003*** −0.010*** −0.004*** −0.007***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_CF 0.240*** 0.275*** 0.325*** 0.423*** 0.409*** 0.487*** 0.371*** 0.430***
(0.091) (0.093) (0.103) (0.088) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
No. obs. 377 287 182 167 2881 2463 3440 2917
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.18
F-value 6.95 8.83 9.93 23.17 131.88 247.00 144.33 239.00
Panel C: (performance-adjusted ROA control group of firms based on size and cash level)
ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y
Intercept −0.004 0.014** −0.004 −0.000 −0.002** −0.007*** −0.002** −0.004**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_ROA 0.215** 0.238*** 0.301*** 0.376*** 0.352*** 0.422*** 0.322*** 0.373***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
No. obs. 383 295 185 171 2901 2495 3469 2961
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.13
F-value 6.18 6.82 10.97 18.21 107.88 185.90 119.13 182.21
Panel D: (performance-adjusted CF, control group of firms based on size and cash level)
CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y
Intercept −0.005 0.013* −0.004 −0.003 −0.002** −0.008*** −0.002** −0.005***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_CF 0.220** 0.246*** 0.297*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 0.461*** 0.351*** 0.409***
(0.085) (0.090) (0.093) (0.094) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
No. obs. 377 287 182 167 2881 2461 3440 2915
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.16
F-value 6.65 7.41 10.16 16.70 138.28 248.45 150.38 237.95
Notes: this table presents the results of an OLS regression of the effect of the pre-merger adjusted operating performance on post-merger adjusted operating per-
formance. The dependent variable is the post-merger adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year +1 (ROA_1Y / CF_1Y) or from year +1 to year +2
(ROA_2Y / CF_2Y). Pre-merger performance is the adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year −1 (or from year −2 to year −1). In Panels A and B, ad-
justed operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA or CF) is measured by the difference between a firm's ROA (CF) and that of the median firm in the industry
in which that firm operates in a given year. In Panels C and D, adjusted operating performance (performance-adjusted ROA or CF) is constructed by subtracting
the benchmark performance (the median performance of the firms in the same portfolio) from the firm's operating performance in each year, where the
benchmark performance is constructed as 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted with the cash ratio (Fama and French, 1993). The t-statistics
(in parentheses) are based on standard errors, which are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. F-value represents the F-test of overall significance. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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our previousfinding of a performance drop after a cash acquisition, in Table 10,we followHarford (1999) and present estimates of OLS
regressions aimed at seeingwhether there is a change in operating performance of acquiring firms aftermergers for deals financed in
different ways. Our baseline regression model is as follows:Post−merger Adj:ROA CFð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1Pre−merger Adj:ROA CFð Þ þ ei ð4ÞThe dependent variable is the post-merger adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year +1 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), or
from year +1 to year +2 (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Independent variables are the pre-merger operating performance of the bidder in
year −1 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), or from year −2 to year −1 (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). As in the previous section, we measure
operating performance using industry-adjusted return on assets (industry-adjusted ROA) and industry-adjusted cash flow (industry-
adjusted CF). The results are reported respectively in Panels A and B of Table 10. We then use performance-adjusted return on
assets (performance-adjusted ROA) and performance-adjusted cash flow (performance-adjusted CF), and report the results
respectively in Panels C and D. The coefficient b1 captures the continuation of pre-merger operating performance for bidding firms.
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period.
Focusing on all bidders, the results in columns 7 and 8 of Table 10 show that the b0 coefficients in the regressions of both adjusted-
ROA (Panel A) and adjusted-CF (Panel B), which measure the change in abnormal operating performance from the pre- to the post-
merger period, are significantly negative at the 1% level. Specifically, focusing on column 8, we observe a b0 coefficient of−0.7% in
both panels, suggesting that on average, there is a significant drop in abnormal operatingperformance from the pre- to the post-merg-
er period. Furthermore, when the regression is performed separately based on themethods of payment (columns 1 to 6), we observe
that the coefficients b0 are positive for stock-financed deals when post-merger adjusted operating performance is measured in a 2-
years window, but still significantly negative for the cash deals regardless of how operating performance is measured.
Thesefindings suggest that cash bidders tend to underperform in termsof operatingperformance from the pre- to thepost-merger
period. This is consistent with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, according to which bidders who use cash as a method
of payment face a lower opportunity cost of holding cash, and are likely to spend their cash on value-decreasing deals.
Overall, the tests in this section support Hypothesis III, according to which cash acquirers perform significantly worse than stock
acquirers both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operatingperformance. They also tell a consistent story thatfirmswith
more financial flexibility and lower investment opportunities are more likely to use cash payments for the acquisition and subse-
quently exhibit worse performance.
5. Conclusions
We investigate M&As in China during the period 1998–2015, focusing on the role of corporate liquidity. We develop a set of hy-
potheses to empirically test the links between firms' financial conditions and their acquisition behavior, as well as their performance
following mergers. First, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), we find that cash-rich firms are more likely to
attempt acquisitions than their cash-poor counterparts. Acquisitions can therefore be seen as a way bywhich firms spend excess cash
instead of paying it out to shareholders. Further, we observe that high-Qfirmswith greater operating performance (ROA) are less like-
ly to attempt acquisitions, implying that good-operating firms with higher growth opportunities do not rely on external investment
like M&As to spend their excess cash.
Second, we find that greater excess cash reserves lead firms that are subject to tunneling to engage in takeover activities. This sug-
gests that Chinese firms are likely to useM&As as a channel to expropriate cash through tunneling. In other words, tunneling is likely
to amplify free cash flow-driven takeovers.
Third, after controlling for all other determinants of themethod of payment, we find that bidders with greater growth opportuni-
ties, reflected by higher stock valuation (Tobin'sQ), are less likely to use cash as amethod of payment. This effect is stronger for finan-
cially constrained firms. This finding is in linewith the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al., 2011), according to
which cash comes at a cost for constrained bidders, especially those with valuable growth opportunities. Hence, the higher their
growth opportunities, the more reluctant are these bidders to use cash to finance acquisitions.
Finally, we observe that the low opportunity costs of cash holdings drive Chinese acquiring firms to make value-destroying cash-
financed acquisitions, which leads to under-performance. Specifically, cash acquisitions underperform stock acquisitions: Cash bid-
ders generate in fact worse announcement abnormal returns compared with stock bidders. Under-performance of cash acquisition
also comes along with a significant post-merger drop in bidders' operating performance.
Our study is in linewith the free cash flowmotive of acquisitions, wherebymanagers tend to waste excess cash reserves on value-
losing cash acquisitions. This effect is found to be particularly large for thosefirms subject to tunneling. Hence, we believe that tunnel-
ing can be a motivation behind acquisition activities in China, a country where the quality of corporate governance is weak (Allen et
al., 2005). Given the relatively high financial capacity which characterizes some Chinese firms due to their high growth rates and abil-
ity to generate large amounts of internal funds (Guariglia et al., 2011), it is essential for these cash-rich firms never to rush into acqui-
sitions (particularly cash acquisitions), but rather to find more efficient and sensible ways to use their liquid assets to pursue
expansion opportunities.
Ongoing reforms should reduce the agency costs associated with acquisitions, improve corporate transparency in M&A transac-
tions, and protect the interests of minority shareholders by increasing the intensity of monitoring by other blockholders or indepen-
dent institutions, aligning the interests between managers and investors, and disclosing connected transactions (e.g. tunneling).
Finally, given that cash is an important resource for firms operating in imperfect capital markets, a cautious approach on how to
use it more efficiently should be promoted. A thorough evaluation of investment projects, as well as a sophisticated regulation and
supervision of corporate profit distribution, and a more market-oriented allocation of resources would therefore benefit the Chinese
economy.
Appendix 1. A case study about tunneling occurring through M&As
China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd. (stock code: 600900.SH) is the largest listed hydropower company in China, with main operations
spanning hydropower generation and the sale of electricity. Yangtze Power is a state-owned enterprise.More than 60% of its shares in
2011 were held by its parent firm, the China Three Gorges Corporation.
On August 31st 2011, Yangtze Power announced the signing of an agreement with Three Gorges on the acquisition of the Under-
ground Power Station (6 units with a capacity of 700 MW each). The takeover proceeded in two batches. On September 30th 2011,
the company accomplished the takeover of the first batch of assets of the Underground Power Station, and on September 18th
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billion RMB for the first and second purchase, respectively).
The book value of the assets of the Underground Power Station was only 7.147 billion RMB, i.e. around 62.9% of its purchasing
price.30 Moreover, based on data published by the National Audit Office on September 10th 2015, all six units of Underground
Power Station had generated 4.255 billion kilowatt-hours of energy per year from its full operation in 2012 to 2014. This corresponds
to a net profit of 218million in total over the period, or to an average profit of 72.7 million per year, and even though production over
those years was 21% in excess of the company's annual design generation capacity,31 it contributed only to 0.114% of earnings per
share.
In summary, due to the high purchase price (high premium) and relatively low profit generated by the acquired company, it is dif-
ficult to see how this acquisition could enhance the value of Yangtze Power. In other words, this related party deal was likely to be
detrimental to minority shareholders, as it transferred benefits to the controlling shareholder (Three Gorges) through the high pre-
mium paid. For this reason, the acquisition of the Underground Power Station can be seen as an example of tunneling taking place
through M&As.
Appendix 2. Definitions of the variables used
Table A1 provides definitions of the variables used in the paper.
Table A1: Variable definitions.3
h
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3
thVariable0 The real value of the assets of th
ighlighted on the audit report of t
rge amount of construction contr
1 The annual design generation c
e annual capacity may be due toDefinitionBlockholders Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder.
CAR3, CAR5:
cumulative abnormal returnsCAR3 and CAR5 are the cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day (−1, +1) and 5-day (−2, +2) event windows,
respectively, where 0 corresponds to the announcement. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the market
model with parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement
for different day event windows around the announcement (day 0).Cash Ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
Cash flow Ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation to total assets
Completed Dummy variable equal to one if the transaction was completed, and zero otherwise.
Competing Dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched an offer for the target while the original bid was pending, and zero
otherwise.
DIF_Blockholders Dummy variable equal to one if the firm's blockholder's controlling ownership exceeds its cash flow ownership in a given
year, and zero otherwise.
DivDum Dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise.
Diversifying Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is not in the same industry as the target (measured using the bidder's and the
target's first two digits of primary SIC code), and zero otherwise.
Employees Number of employees.
Experienced Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder has announced at least 3 takeover bids over the five-year period prior to the deal
announcement, and 0 otherwise.
Financial Acquirer Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is buying a non-financial target company for financial reasons rather than for
strategic reasons, and zero otherwise.
Financial Sponsor Dummy variable equal to one if the deal has any buyout or financial sponsor involvement on either the buying side or the
selling side, and zero otherwise.
KZ index Following Lamont et al. (2001), the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index is a linear function of five variables. Specifically:
KZt = −1.002 ∗ CFt / Kt − 1 + 0.283 ∗ Qt + 3.139 ∗ Debtt / TKt − 39.368 ∗ (DIVt / Kt − 1) − 1.315 ∗ Casht / Kt − 1
where t indexes time; CFt is cash flow (net income + depreciation); Qt is Tobin's Q; Debtt is the sum of short- and long-term
debt; DIVt is dividends; Casht is cash and cash equivalents; Kt is capital; TKt is total capital (sum of debt and equity). A firm
with a higher value of the KZ index can be intended to be more financially constrained.Leverage Ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets.
Market value of assets Sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book value of non-tradable stocks, and market value of net debt.
Method of payment:
Cash Only, Mixed PYMT,
Payment_cash, Stock OnlyCash Only: dummy variable equal to one if the payment is pure cash, and zero otherwise.Mixed PYMT: dummy variable equal
to one if the payment is neither all-cash nor all-stock, and zero otherwise. Payment_cash: dummy variable equal to one if the
payment is mainly cash (N50%), and zero otherwise. Stock Only: dummy variable equal to one if the payment is pure stock,
and zero otherwise.NWC Ratio of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets.
OREC Ratio of other receivables to total assets.
Payout Dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays dividends in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Public_deals Dummy variable equal to one if the target is a listed firm, and zero otherwise.
PE (price-to-earnings ratio) Ratio of market value per share to earnings per share.
Return Annual stock returns
Runup_stock Cumulative daily stock price returns of the bidder over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the
announcement date.
Runup_market Cumulative daily Shanghai and Shenzhen value-weighted stock returns over the period beginning 205 days and endingeUnderground Power Station is likely to be over-estimated. On September 30th 2011, theNational Audit Office raised several issues
he final accounts at the completion of the underground power station project. 337.9 million RMB remained unaccounted for and a
act projects (1.54 billion RMB) was involved in hidden accounting and corruption problems.
apacity refers to themaximumelectric output power stations can produce under specific conditions. The excess generation of 21% of
the high runoff in the Yangtze River.
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6 days prior to the deal announcement.
Return on assets (ROA) Ratio of net income to total assets.
Rumors Dummy variable equal to one if the transaction is currently (or originally began as) a rumor, and zero otherwise.
Sigma_stock Standard deviation of the bidding firm's daily returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the
announcement date.
Sales growth Rate of growth of real sales.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.
Size_ratio Ratio of transaction value divided by the bidder's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement
Shareholding_CEO Dummy variable equal to one if the firm's top executives (including the CEO) are holding shares in their own company, and
zero otherwise.
SOEs Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is state owned in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Tobin Tobin's Q: sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net
debt, divided by the book value of total assets.
Unfriendly Dummy variable equal to one if the deal is not defined as friendly by Thomson Financial SDC, and zero otherwise.
Var_CF Mean of the standard deviations of cash flow over total assets of firms in the same industry.
WW index Derived from Whited and Wu (2006), theWW index is a linear function based on six financial variables. Specifically:
WWt = −0.091 ∗ CFt / BAt − 1 − 0.062 ∗ Payoutt + 0.021 ∗ TLTDt / CAt − 1 − 0.044 ∗ LNBAt − 0.035 ∗ SGRt + 0.102 ∗ ISGt
where t indexes time; CFt is cash flow (net income + depreciation); BAt is book assets; Payoutt is a dummy indicating
positive dividends; TLTDt is long-term debt; CAt is total current assets; Qt is Tobin's Q; LNBAt is the natural log of the book
value of assets; SGRt is firm real sales growth; ISGt is industry sales growth. A firm with a higher value of theWW index can
be intended to be more financially constrained.Notes: all variables (with the exception of dummy variables) are deflated using the GDP deflator, which is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Appendix 3. Measure of excess cash
Excess cash (Xcash) is used to assess whether there is a relationship between cash-richness and acquisition decisions. Following
Opler et al. (1999), excess cash is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash holdings from the actual value of cash and
cash equivalents (Cash). Specifically, in the OPSWmodel, cash holdings are assumed to be a function of Tobin's Q (defined as the firm's
market-to-book ratio); Firm size (defined as the natural logarithmof the firm's total assets); Cash flow (defined as the ratio of the sum
of net profit and depreciation to total assets); NWC (defined as the ratio of net working capital to total assets); CAPEX (defined as the
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets); Leverage (defined as the ratio of short- and long-term debt to total assets);DivDum (a div-
idend payout dummy set to one if thefirmpays dividends, and 0 otherwise);Var_CF (themean of the standard deviations of cashflow
over total assets of firms in the same industry). As ownership is likely to be important in the Chinese context, we also control for state
ownership, by including a dummy variable (SOEs) that takes the value of 1 if the firm is state owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to face financial constraints. Therefore, according to the precautionary motive, one
should expect SOEs to hold less cash than their non state-owned counterparts.
For firm i in year t and industry j, the model of cash holdings is therefore given by the following equation:Cashi;t ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Qi;t þ b2Sizei;t þ b3CFi;t þ b4NWCi;t þ b5CAPEXi;t
þb6Leveragei;t þ b7DivDumi;t þ b8VarCF j;t þ b9SOEsi;t þ vi þ vt þ vp þ εi;t
ð5ÞXk,i,t is the vector of k explanatory variables that affect the costs and benefits of cash holdings. Eq. (5) also incorporates time and
provincial dummies, which account for year (vt) and regional (vp) fixed-effects associated with firms' cash holdings.
The regression is estimated using the fixed-effects estimator, which accounts for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity (vi).32 It
should be noted that because of collinearity, industry dummies cannot be included in the equations when the fixed-effects estimator
is used. Thefitted values of Eq. (5) can be interpreted as a proxy for the optimal level of cashholdings.Wemeasure excess cash (Xcash)
as the difference between the actual values of cash holdings and the fitted values derived from Eq. (5).
Appendix 4. Predicting the probability of being a bidder
In addition to the role played by excess cash holdings described in Section 4.1, the results in column 1 of Table 3 also show that the
marginal effects associated with Return, Tobin, ROA and Size, have positive and significant signs, which suggests that larger firmswith
higher stock market returns (Return), higher investment opportunities (Tobin), and better operating performance (ROA) are more
likely to make acquisitions. These findings are in line with Roll (1986) and Harford (1999), and support the hubris theory, according
to which takeover deals can be promoted by firms' better performance and returns. Specifically, due to acquirer managers' hubris, ex-
cessive arrogance, andmyopia, a higher firm profitability may leadmanagers with discretion to make self-interested and entrenched
decisions on acquisitions, in order to diversify their personal portfolios and increase the scale and scope of operating assets in their
hands (Moeller et al., 2004).r brevity but available upon request. We also estimated Eq. (5) separately in each year of the sample period, in order to allow the
ary from year to year. The results remained substantially unchanged.
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pact on the probability of being a bidder. This can be explained as follows. First, when the firm's CEO holds shares in his/her own com-
pany (Shareholding_CEO), thismay reduce the agency costs faced by the firm sincemanagerial ownershipmay help to alignmanagers'
interests with those of the firm's shareholders.33 Thus, managers who hold shares in their own company may be less likely to make
acquisitions due to personal interests. Second, a large ownership stake held by the blockholder (Blockholders) tends to lower the sep-
aration of voting rights and cash flow rights, whichmay lower the tendency of managers to engage in takeovers for tunneling reasons
(Jiang et al., 2010). Moreover, a relatively large stake may give the primary owners a higher incentive to oversee or monitor theman-
agers, alleviating therefore agency costs stemming from a conflict of interest between firm managers and shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Ang et al., 2000). Alternatively, controlling owners with a relatively large stake might be reluctant to lose the control
of their firms by engaging in acquisitions. Therefore, firms characterized by a high ownership stake of controlling shareholdersmay be
more cautious in making investments through M&As (Amihud et al., 1990).Appendix 5. Other determinants of the method of payment
Focusing on variables other than Tobin's Q and its interaction with the financing constraints dummies in Eq. (2), we observe that
the marginal effect associated with the bidder's cash flow (CF) is positive and significant in all columns of Table 5. This is consistent
with the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), according to which higher amounts of cash flow may increase the likelihood of
cash payments in acquisitions. Next, we find significant and positive signs on the marginal effects associated with the variable
(Shareholding_CEO) and our indicator of financial bidder (Financial Acquirer), suggesting that when the acquiring company's CEO
holds shares in his/her own company or when the bidder is buying a non-financial target company for financial rather than for stra-
tegic reasons, cash payments are preferred. A possible explanation for the former is that the acquiring firm tends to spend cash to re-
lieve the agency problems of free cash flow associated with CEO shareholding (Harford, 1999). Alternatively, it is possible that CEOs
holding shares in their own company are unwilling to dilute their stake in the bidding firm. A possible explanation for the positive
marginal effects associated with the Financial Acquirer variable is that the acquiring firmwhich engages in M&As for financial reasons
is either a buyout firm, a merchant bank, a commercial bank or an investment bank. As such, they might hold more cash, which en-
ables them, in turn, to produce the funds necessary to make a cash deal.
We also find that the probability of choosing cash payments is positively related to the dummy variable (Experienced), which im-
plies that those bidders who have conducted multiple takeover deals prefer to use cash, probably due to the higher liquidity at their
disposal.34
Turning to the deal's characteristics, consistent with Faccio and Lang (2002), Harford et al. (2009) and Karampatsas et al. (2014),
we observe that the variable regarding the targets' listing status (Public_deals) has negative and significantmarginal effects in all spec-
ifications, suggesting that in deals where unlisted targets are involved, a greater use of cash is made, while stock payments are more
attractive for bidders of listed targets. This can be explained considering that private sellers should be more likely to accept cash as a
method of payment due to their consumption and liquidity needs. In addition, stock acquisitions of unlisted targets with a concentrat-
ed ownership structure would dilute the dominant shareholders' stake in bidding firms, and potentially create a large rival
blockholder, which could represent a corporate control threat for the bidder (Amihud et al., 1990).
The attitude indicator for the deals defined as unfriendly (Unfriendly) has a negative and significant marginal effect in all regres-
sion. This result is consistent with unfriendly bidder preference for cash financing to close the deal quickly, thus deterring other com-
peting bidders and aggressive defenses against hostile takeovers (Linn and Switzer, 2001; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Alshwer et al.,
2011). Fishman (1989) documents that unlike the value of stock payments, which is contingent upon the profitability of the acquisi-
tion, a cash offer facilitates amore rapid deal completion. By contrast, stock paymentswill lower the speed of the takeover process due
to security registration and the requirements of approval by the bidder's shareholders. Furthermore, using stock lowers the likelihood
of acceptance since a stock offer is presumed to have a low value (Gilson and Black, 1986; Fishman, 1989).
Next, we find significant and negative signs on the marginal effects associated with the indicators of deal completion (Completed)
and of competing bids (Competing), suggesting that completed acquisitions and the oneswhich involve competing bidders tend to use
non-cash payments. A possible explanationmay be that non-cashmergers are more likely to be associatedwith administrative trans-
fers or connected transactions between one government agency and another. Under the command of the government, these non-cash
deals may attract more bidders in M&A negotiations and are more likely to be completed.
We also find a negative marginal effect associated with the Financial Sponsor variable, which suggests that bidders with financial
sponsor involvement (which include private equity- as well as venture capital-backed deals) prefer to use stocks as a method of pay-
ment. This can be explained in the light of the fact that private equity-owned companies have substantially high debt levels and there-
fore limited capacity to raise cashfinancing externally (Leslie andOyer, 2008). Hence, they prefer to use stock as amethod of payment.33 Alternatively, it may be the case that managers decide to foregoM&As, as financing them bymeans of a stock swapwould dilute their stake in the company by too
large an extent.
34 Due to hubris or entrenchment, multiple acquisitions may be used by management to spend excess liquidity, destroying firms' value (Billett and Qian, 2008; Black
et al., 2015). The negative announcement effect for bidders who have conducted multiple takeover deals (shown in Section 4.4.1.2 and discussed in Appendix 6) con-
firms the hubris conjecture.
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Focusing on variables other than Payment_Cash, Tobin's Q, and their interaction in Eq. (3), Table 8first shows a significantly positive
coefficient on the bidder's cash flow (CF), which suggests that the market reacts more positively to mergers with high cash flow
bidders.
Second, the coefficients on the dummy variables SOEs and Experienced are generally significantly negative, which suggests that
state-owned acquiring firms and firms that make many acquisitions are more likely to undertake low-benefit M&A deals. The former
can be explained considering that even though acquiring firms from the state sector might enjoy favorable financial and political sup-
port due to government intervention (Zhou et al., 2015), non-economic motivations (e.g. tunneling) may lead to misallocation of
firms' resources. Consistent with Billett and Qian (2008) and Black et al. (2015), the latter can be explained by the fact that hubris
and over-confidence developed from past acquisitions may lead to value-losing deals.
Third, the announcement returns increasewith the higher relative size of the deal. This is consistentwith findings reported for Chi-
nese listed firms by Zhou et al. (2015) and Black et al. (2015), and for USfirms by Asquith et al. (1983) andMoeller et al. (2004). It may
be explained considering that the larger the size of the deal, the more significant the addition to the bidder's value (Asquith et al.,
1983). Yet, the coefficients associated with Size_ratio are virtually 0.
Fourth, we find that the gain to acquirers is positively associated with diversifying deals (Diversifying). This is in line with recent
research according to which diversification may be related to higher firm value (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004), as
firms may choose to diversify to move away from industries with relatively low growth prospects.
Fifth, both the indicators of rumored deals (Rumors) and of financial bidder (Financial Acquirer) are negatively and significantly as-
sociated with abnormal returns.35 The former is in line with recent findings according to which rumors may significantly impact
merger outcomes and post-acquisition performance, among other things (Alperovych et al., 2016; Cumming et al., 2016). Given
the fact that rumors can destroy the deal value (Alperovych et al., 2016), markets respond negatively to a takeover rumor. The latter
suggests that financially motivated M&As might achieve fewer synergies than strategically motivated ones.
Sixth, the indicators of deal completion (Completed) and of competing bids (Competing) are positively and significantly associated
with the bidder's returns.36 The former suggests that failure to complete carries costs.37 The latter might be due to the fact that the
occurrence of competing bids conveys positive information and thus leads to positive abnormal announcement returns.
Seventh, we find that the Financial Sponsor dummy is positively related with bidders' announcement CARs. This can be explained
considering that experienced financial sponsors are able to identify and structure deals so as to achieve greater synergies.
Lastly, in line with Rosen (2006) and Golubov et al. (2012), the stock price run-up of acquiring firms (Runup_stock) is negatively
associatedwith abnormal returns. This may be due to hubris: Recent success may lead to incorrect business decisionmaking, asman-
agers affected by hubris may think they have better information about the target value than themarket, and believe that the deal can
create value in the long run. Therefore, these managers may tend to offer excessively high premiums for the targets. The market may
perceive this situation, which may cause a reverse reaction to the pre-merger performance.
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